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IntroductIon
Ukraine has been an independent state for only 20 years and the consequence 
of the long-term incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian/Soviet state 
is an ethnically mixed society. In Ukraine, alongside Ukrainians, there are 
very many Russians and members of other nationalities of the former Soviet 
Union as well as a still large group of people who identify themselves as Soviets 
(in terms of their nationality). A significant part of Ukrainians use Russian 
in their everyday life (particularly professional) while knowing Ukrainian to 
only a small degree or not at all. Due to this Kyiv has to implement a language 
policy (which does not have to be pursued in e.g. Poland or Hungary) in search 
of solutions to ensure the stable functioning of a modern state for a multilin-
gual society. The language issue is therefore an important challenge for the 
Ukrainian state and one of the more significant issues in Ukraine’s internal 
politics. 
Since the very beginning of its independence Ukraine has been a bilingual 
state/society: a considerable section of its citizens irrespective of their de-
clared nationality have used exclusively Russian in speech and particularly in 
writing. Despite this fact, the Ukrainian constitution of 1996 states that there 
is one state and official language, rather on the grounds of symbolism than 
pragmatism. The state from the beginning has tolerated a wide extent of the 
use of Russian in various spheres of public life, including in parliament. This 
was possible due to the mutual transparency (intelligibility) of the Russian and 
Ukrainian languages. 
The language issue in Ukraine has four basic aspects: everyday use (com-
munication between people), formal and official use (the functioning of the 
state, particularly the legal and education systems), the commercial aspect 
(the press, books and electronic media market, and advertisements) and the 
symbolic and identity aspect. The first aspect is the least important as the 
Ukrainian and Russian languages are similar. The crucial aspect is the sym-
bolic one which affects the establishment of reasonable and fair solutions in 
the remaining aspects. On the one hand, Ukrainian national thought identi-
fies belonging to the nation with the use of its language (thus granting this 
element nigh on complete importance). On the other hand, a section of the 
Russian-speaking circles believes that the use Russian in public life is a po-
litical declaration of belonging to the “Slavic/Russian community” defined 
as opposed to the Ukrainian national community distinct from the Russian 
nation. For this reason the “language dispute” is becoming a dispute over 
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a symbolic and ideological rule and the significance of this aspect has been 
growing with the passage of time.
The language issue in Ukraine reveals the contradiction between the right 
of a democratic country to define and impose the language which is compul-
sory in official, educational and symbolic areas and the right citizens have to 
choose the language which they want to use, including in contacts with state 
institutions authorities, and in which they want their children to be taught. 
In fundamentally monoethnic countries such as Poland or Hungary the solu-
tion is simple (limited concessions for few minority groups). In multilingual 
countries such as Spain and particularly in bilingual countries – Belgium or 
Ukraine – there appears a problem to which a good and especially universal 
solution has not yet been found. 
A considerable section of Ukrainian citizens in daily life uses mainly or ex-
clusively Russian; the 20 years of independence have only led to a certain re-
duction in number of people who admit to this. In terms of language, Ukraine 
considerably varies from region to region: in the west the Ukrainian language 
is clearly predominant, whereas in the east and south – it is Russian. It seems, 
however, that the process of the official (formal) Ukrainisation of social life 
is being accompanied by a spontaneous Russification: a stronger presence of 
Ukrainian in social life in the east and south of the country is being paralleled 
to an increased presence of the Russian language in the centre and the west1. 
The possibilities for resolving the language problem are the following: toler-
ating the present state of “unofficial bilingualism”, legalisation of the use of 
Russian in public life in a narrower or wider scope in the entire territory of 
Ukraine or in part of the country (as long as it is recognised as an equal state 
language) or a planned and consistent removal of the Russian language from 
public life; in the short term the first option seems the most probable. 
One of the leading Ukrainian political analysts, Volodymyr Fesenko stated re-
cently that “The [language] issue does exist. Although it is not the country’s 
most urgent problem. The optimal option is in my opinion to maintain and con-
sistently implement the state status of the Ukrainian language and to grant 
1 The examples concerning Lviv in: Ilko Lemko, I mova tvoya vykazuye tebe, http://postup.
brama.com/dinamic/i_pub/usual.php?what=8361, visited at 18.03.2003. This process has 
been confirmed by observations made by numerous people, including the author of the pre-
sent report. 
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official status to the Russian language at the regional level in places where 
clusters of Russian-speaking citizens of the country live”2. This “optimal op-
tion” is in fact an attempt at squaring the circle; it could be feasible if it had 
not been for the symbolic and identity-related importance of the issue which 
makes a painless solution – one satisfactory to all parties – unrealistic. 
The aim of this report is to outline the language issue in Ukraine and its social 
context, with a particular focus placed on important questions, which are usu-
ally overlooked in similar publications, such as the trade (commercial) aspect 
of language regulations in the media and the key role of the “language issue” in 
Ukraine’s identity policy (the symbolic, historical policy etc.). 
In the first section I focus on general questions; important in order to un-
derstand the language issue in Ukraine but having a more general nature. 
These are followed by the main practical aspects of the language dimension of 
Ukraine’s social and economic life, the significance of the rivalry between the 
Ukrainian and Russian languages for the country’s symbolic identity. Finally, 
I approach the Ukrainian law relating to the language, including the draft of 
a new law which is underway. The appendix presents the data on Ukraine’s 
national minorities, including the extent to which they are Russified or Ukrai-
nised in terms of the language. 
In this text I eschew a detailed analysis of the question of Crimea as its social 
dynamics (also in the language area) is clearly distinct from the remaining 
part of Ukraine for four reasons: the short-term character of the region’s links 
with Ukraine, its relative geographic isolation (Crimea is almost an island), the 
formal autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the presence of 
the Crimean Tatar community which is demanding the recognition of its lan-
guage rights.
2 www.glavred.info/archive/2011/08/02/081759-0.html, visited at 02.08.2011.
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I. INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
The discourse about the language situation in Ukraine is heavily influenced 
by ideology and is largely based on currently anachronistic terms. Discus-
sions are focused on the question of which language people speak instead of 
the question of whether they can use it to read and write official documents3. 
Numerous problems are ignored, among them the immigration-influenced na-
ture of a substantial part of Ukrainian society, the consequences of the mutual 
intelligibility of Ukrainian and Russian, challenges linked to the change in the 
nature and the way of shaping the linguistic norm in contemporary societies 
etc. For these reasons I have deemed it appropriate to make certain introduc-
tory comments which go beyond the scope of the formally defined subject of 
this report. 
1. The role of language in the life of a modern state 
For a modern, bureaucratic state the official language is one of the main in-
struments of functioning. The education system, public administration offices, 
courts and the army must use one common medium; it must be standardised 
(unequivocal, codified) and commonly used. For these reasons a modern state 
seeks to ensure the exclusive use of one language in the official circuit and in 
education, thus limiting the presence in social life of both dialects and lan-
guages of minority groups. In the latter area bilingualism is sometimes accept-
ed but not the exclusive use of the language spoken by a minority. 
Modern European nations are characterised by a commonly shared culture 
and therefore language (culture and identity must be expressed in the lan-
guage). Therefore organisations which create the national life – state organisa-
tions, independent or anti-state (irredentist) ones – aim at ensuring that the 
language which is considered national is used exclusively or predominantly as 
the medium of culture. They also seek to grant it symbolic status (as the dis-
tinctive feature of belonging to the nation). These organisations also make ef-
forts to guarantee the highest possible degree of completeness of this language 
(its capacity to operate in all spheres of social life, from family contacts to the 
translations of leading works of science and world literature). 
3 I have not found data which would enable the written command of Ukrainian and Russian 
to be assessed. 
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2. The linguistic norm in the post-modern society 
Until recently the emphasis in European languages was placed on the writ-
ten (literary) standard4 which ensured the harmonisation of the legislation 
and administration, and particularly school education. This norm was shaped 
above all by writers and lexicographers and implemented by teachers of gener-
al schools. Over last 20 years an important change has occurred: as the written 
media (press, books) have ceded their role as the main transmission channel 
to the spoken media (radio, TV), the cachet of spoken language – by its nature 
more flexible and colloquial – has increased at the expense of the written lan-
guage form. In recent years this process has been reinforced by the arrival of 
Internet communicators and text messages which only in a formal sense use 
text, whereas in reality they are a form of oral communication. The second fac-
tor at play was the weakening of the authority of school as the first and main 
source of knowledge of the world and, consequently, as the teacher of the lan-
guage which describes the world. 
As a result, a new linguistic norm has emerged which is much more chang-
ing, which easily adopts dialectic elements, neologisms (including borrowed 
words) and slang innovations and is much less concerned about formal con-
nectedness. This form is shaped and promoted by both journalists and celebri-
ties. 
It appears that at least in Europe the written language has lost its standardis-
ing and normative role, the more so since – as was not the case in the 1970s – in-
novations of the spoken language are almost immediately adopted in written 
language, which accelerates the wavering of the written language norm and 
even the administrative language norm.
The described phenomena are subject to the attention of a section of journalists 
and social thinkers and in several countries (such as France) they have caused 
the government to counteract. However it is quite unusual that reflection ap-
pears on the issue that the weakening of the linguistic norm in a country where 
two very similar languages co-exist (as is the case with Ukraine) leads to a par-
ticular danger: blurring distinctions between them through the same innova-
tions adopted by both languages (especially numerous Anglicisms—usually of 
4 The English term as well as the Ukrainian one unfortunately refers to literature; the French 
term of langue d’ lettre simply means the written form of the language. 
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
5/
20
12
10
American origin) and ignoring and the diminishing phonetic and grammatical 
elements which make these languages distinct. 
3. The immigration-based nature of Ukrainian society 
The south and east of Ukraine, nearly a third of the country’s contemporary ter-
ritory, were populated by farmers and town dwellers for the first time towards 
the end of the 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th century (Donetsk was 
established in approximately 1860 not at the location of a former village but in 
the open steppe). These areas were at that time populated simultaneously by 
Ukrainians and Russians but also Germans, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Jews, Poles 
and representatives of other nationalities. Mass immigration, particularly to 
the east of Ukraine and to port towns continued uninterrupted until World War 
II. Those were, however, internal migrations whose dynamics and especially 
the ethnic structure have been only cursorily researched; all the papers I have 
come across on Ukraine’s history do no more than point out this topic. 
For the issue examined in the present paper it is above all the immigration of 
the 1940s which is important as it has substantially changed Ukraine’s ethnic 
and social makeup. According to the latest research the Ukrainian Soviet So-
cialist Republic (within the borders of 1938) had a population of 29 million peo-
ple according to the 1926 census and estimates for the beginning of the 1930s 
show the population was approximately 30–31 million people. In 1933–1944 it 
lost almost one third of its population, approximately 10 million died, were 
murdered or were killed in battle5. The population of the “old” Ukraine” was 
estimated at 25 million in 19466. Despite this, according to the 1959 census (the 
first after the war) Ukraine had (within its new borders) 42 million people. 
Such a rapid increase was possible only due to mass immigration. Similarly in 
the following decades Ukraine continued to be populated by displaced people 
5 Compare Timothy Snyder, Skrwawione ziemie, Warszawa 2011, p. 435 (original title: Blood-
lands, Basic Books, 2010). 
6 According to Soviet estimates there were 31.6 million inhabitants of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (within the borders of 1938) at the beginning of 1941 and 25.4 million in-
habitants in July 1946. The number of inhabitants of western districts (annexed in the af-
termath of the World War II) was estimated in July 1946 (after the “exchange of populations” 
between Poland and the USSR was completed) at 6.7 million, later a few hundred thousand 
inhabitants of these lands were deported deeper into the USSR. The population of Crimea at 
the moment of its annexation into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1954) stood at 1.2 
million, the overwhelming majority of them being post-war immigrants. The source of the 
figures: Piotr Eberhardt, Przemiany narodowościowe na Ukrainie XX wieku, Warsaw 1994, 
table on p. 178. 
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from other republics and Ukrainians went to inhabit other republics, which 
was stimulated by the government of the USSR. The latter process also in-
creased the proportion of immigrants in Ukraine’s population. 
The scale of immigration in Ukraine from other territories of the USSR has not 
been researched. The fact, though, that it was mass immigration is commonly 
recognised. Bohdan Kravchenko believes that in 1959–1970 approximately one 
million Russians went to Ukraine and in 1939–1970 overall as many as 9 mil-
lion7. Piotr Eberhardt states that in 1959–1970 the number of Ukrainians in 
Ukraine rose by 10% and the number of Russian grew by 29%, which he as-
cribes to a large extent to the immigration of Russians, although he does not 
attempt to estimate the scale of this immigration. He also writes that in Donbas 
“the overwhelming majority of the population is not autochthonous, they came 
here from both Ukraine and Russia”8. Borys Levytsky claims that in 1959–1970 
the number of Russians among the inhabitants of Ukrainian towns and cities 
increased from 5.7 to 7.1 million, which can only partly be explained by the 
assimilation of Ukrainians. In towns in the Kharkiv district9 the number of 
Russians grew by 192%, in the Dnipropetrovsk district by 200%, and in the 
Zaporizhia district by 227%10. Finally, it stems from the comparison of further 
censuses that in 1959–1989 the number of Russians in Ukraine rose by 60%, 
whereas the number of Ukrainians grew by 16% and altogether the population 
of the republic increased by 23%11. 
All this shows that the number of “inter-Soviet” immigrants (not only Rus-
sians) from the post-war period (1944–1990) in Ukraine amounts to anywhere 
from several million to over ten million people and when their children and 
grandchildren are included this figure could reach as much as one third of the 
population12. They are mainly concentrated in the large industrial centres in 
7 B. Kravchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine, 
London 1985, p. 223–224.
8 Piotr Eberhardt, op. cit., p. 220, 268.
9 “Oblast’” in both Ukrainian and Russian.
10 B. Levytsky, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine 1953-1980, p. 116, 137 n.
11 Not only Russians were immigrants, for example the number of Belarusians in Ukraine 
increased at that time by 51%.
12 On the basis of available date it is not possible to justify this last figure, it however does not 
seem implausible, particularly when having in mind the fact that in Latvia and Estonia Rus-
sians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (almost exclusively immigrants and their descendants) 
according to the census data accounted for approximately 30% of the population around 
2000. 
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the east and south of Ukraine, Kiev and Crimea. There are also many immi-
grants from the 1940s and 1950s and their descendants in the towns of west-
ern Ukraine, where before the war Poles and Jews were predominant. The new 
governments had to “make use” of the abandoned towns quickly and establish 
an administration in what was basically a hostile environment. They were able 
to do it only by sending in staff from other regions of the country. A consid-
erable part of those who arrived (both immediately after the war and in the 
following decades) were linked with the armed forces. An important section 
of those immigrants, particularly their descendants, identify themselves to 
a greater extent with Ukraine as a country and state but few of them identify 
themselves with the Ukrainian ethnic nation, which is not surprising since 
they are not ethnic Ukrainians. 
From the point of view of the issue examined in this paper, the above men-
tioned question is important since, for the “immigrant” part of Ukrainian 
society, the Ukrainian language, even if they know it well, remains a foreign 
language (especially in the symbolic and identity-related sphere) and the state 
should take this into account. It seems, however, that this issue goes entirely 
unnoticed, even now when Ukraine’s prime minister is an immigrant and the 
country’s president is the son of immigrants13. 
4.  Surzhyk
Surzhyk is a Ukraine-specific language phenomenon14, made possible thanks 
to the co-existence of two mutually intelligible languages in the same area. It 
is a degraded form of language communication, which is not a dialect (these 
are governed by a set of rules which can be described). According to Artur 
Branicki’s definition it is a “type of speech (…) based on the Ukrainian lan-
guage and featuring strong influences from the Russian language which have 
formed as a result of a long-term co-existence of the two languages, this co-
existence has the characteristics of asymmetrical bilingualism”15. According 
to sociologists Surzhyk is used daily by approximately 16–18% of the population 
13 Mykola (Nikolai) Azarov was born in Kaluga, in a Russian family, he settled in Ukraine at 
the age of 38. Viktor Yanukovych is the son of immigrants from Belarus and Russia, brought 
up in a then entirely Russian-speaking environment in Donbas. 
14 Trasianka present in Belarus has a similar nature. 
15 Artur Bracki, Surżyk. Historia i teraźniejszość, Published by Uniwersytet Gdański, Gdańsk 
2009, p. 14. This work is the first attempt in the world’s literature at a complex scientific 
analysis of this phenomenon. The fact that Ukrainian language experts have so far written 
merely a few more serious articles about it seems significant. 
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of Ukraine, mainly in the central part of the country, where 40% use “more or 
less correct Ukrainian” and 42% – “more or less correct Russian”16. Together 
with the generational change and the weakening of the linguistic norm (both 
the Ukrainian and the Russian ones) shaped by literature, a new phenomenon 
has appeared, still escaping the attention of sociologists17; a weaker sense of 
the distinctiveness of the two languages (particularly their spoken versions). 
The older generation was genuinely bilingual and was aware of using one or 
the other language at a given moment; young people (also younger journalists) 
more and more often mix elements of the two languages, they “just” speak, 
although they take offence when this type of speech is called Surzhyk. 
Contrary to the above mentioned term, “speech”, Surzhyk is also employed in 
writing, albeit in the non-official circuit (especially in private correspond-
ence). Until recently it was a shameful, hidden phenomenon. This is, how-
ever, changing under the influence of its commonplace use by popular music 
artists and comedians, particularly by Andriy Danylko under the pseudonym 
of Verka Serduchka18. For the time being Surzhyk has not appeared in popu-
lar literature as a narrative instrument (although it is used in dialogues as 
a feature of characters); if this occurred, it would mean the beginning of the 
normativisation of Surzhyk and the emergence of a new linguistic standard – 
the “Ukrussian language”19. It cannot be ruled out that a section of Ukraine’s 
society is instinctively seeking to create such a language, which is hampered 
by the lack of social and especially political consent to use it in writing. This 
tendency is being noticed by several politicians such as Oles Doniy who as 
early as in 2000 announced that Surzhyk is a legitimate variety of the Ukrain-
ian language and it has to be used in writing because “Surzhyk is better than 
Russian”20. For the time being, however, Surzhyk is only blurring the Ukrain-
ian linguistic norm while not establishing an alternative norm, which is the 
main threat linked to it. 
16 See: http://2000.net.ua/2000/aspekty/slovo/72876, visited at 11.04.2011 and Mykola Riab-
chuk, Dve Ukrainy, Wrocław 2004, p. 39. 
17 I am referring here to the opinions of Kyiv’s writers of the young generation, expressed in 
private talks. 
18 Danylko popularised the character of Serduchka – a primitive, Surzhyk-speaking Ukrain-
ian woman in advertising spots for Pryvatbank. Later he launched an independent and 
enormously successful stage career. The ostentatious kitsch of his songs was aimed at ridi-
culing Serduchka, her way of living and speaking but as a result of this it was ennobled. 
19 The term coined by Kyiv’s writer Volodymyr Arenev (Zobrazit’ meni ray, Kyiv 2009, p. 136). 
20 Oles Doniy, Khaj zhyve surzhyk!, www.molodaukraina.org/news.asp?IdType=12&Id=229, 
visited at 11.01.2005.
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5. The terminology problem: the state/official language21 
In English the term “state language” is seldom used, whereas the term “official 
language” means the language which is compulsory in the state in all spheres 
of its functioning. In Ukrainian and Russian there is however a clear differ-
ence between the state language (in Ukrainian derzhavna mova, in Russian go-
sudarstvenny yazyk), and the official language (in Ukrainian ofitsiyna mova, in 
Russian uriadovy yazyk) which denotes the language used by the administra-
tion and can be different from the state language. 
These reasons explain the demand – which is difficult to translate into English 
– to grant the Russian language the status of the “second official/administra-
tion language”, which is different from the demand of granting it the status 
of the “second official/state language”. The first demand means that Russian 
would be introduced in public administration offices, courts and schools as 
equal to Ukrainian (granting these institutions bilingual status), which can 
be implemented without an amendment to the constitution and applied local-
ly also with regard to several other minority languages. The second demand 
means that the state would become, also in the symbolic sphere, bilingual; this 
can be implemented only through the amendment of the constitution and will 
necessarily discriminate against the languages of the remaining minorities. 
6. The terminology problem: the native language
The Ukrainian and Russian terms “ridna mova / rodnoy yazyk” are usually trans-
lated as the “native language”. However, this term does not necessarily mean the 
first language learnt. The word “ridny / rodnoy” denotes both “native”, “family” 
and also “familiar”. In the present text the word used is “native language” but it 
has to be borne in mind that this is only an approximate translation. 
In the view of Ukrainians and Russians themselves this term is not unambigu-
ous—surveys reveal that 34% of respondents understand the term “native” as 
referring to the language in which they think and talk freely; for 32% of those 
surveyed it refers to the language of the nation they belong to; for 24% it is the 
21 The present and the following sub-chapters are not an exact translation of the Polish text 
but an adaptation for English-speaking readers. Also in the following parts some excerpts, 
which are intelligible only in the Polish language, have been altered or removed.
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language of their parents; and for 9% it is the language they use most often22. 
This ambiguity calls into question the results of all research which looks into 
the native language without examining the significance respondents accorded 
to this term, above all the value of all the data on the degree of identification 
with the nation and the language recorded in censuses.
In certain Soviet censuses the notion of the native language was defined in 
various ways. In 1920 it was the language spoken at home by the family of the 
person subject to the census (yazyk v bytu) and in mixed families it was taken 
to be the language spoken by the mother. In 1926 the native language was con-
sidered the language which the person subject to the census commands best or 
usually uses (golovny rozgovorny yazyk), in 1939 it was the language which the 
person interviewed perceives as the native (rodnoy) language, in 1959–1979 the 
people interviewed for census purposes were granted the right to determine 
which language they considered native and when doubts arose it was ordered 
that the language they knew best or which they used in the family be record-
ed23. Similar rules were used in the last Soviet and the first Ukrainian census. 
Thus in censuses a given language was ascribed to both the people who deemed 
it native (in general the language of the declared nationality) even if it was not 
necessarily used in everyday life, and also to the people who considered it na-
tive (used everyday) but it was not necessarily linked to their declared nation-
ality or that of their spouses (in mixed families Russian was generally declared 
as the language used at home also in families where nobody in the family was 
Russian). 
22 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, Zerkalo Nedeli, nr 34, 2010.
23 V.I. Kozlov, Nacyonalnosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskiy obzor, Moscow 1982, p. 236n.
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II. THE UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES  
IN UKRAINE’S SOCIAL LIFE (SELECTED ASPECTS) 
1. Linguistic identification in the light of sociological research
Before we proceed to outline the language situation in Ukraine, it is worth mak-
ing a review of certain facts about the Soviet language policy. After Stalin’s death 
the “repressive” Russification ceased and its place was taken by a policy which 
was pursued without larger changes until the end of the USSR. The “republican” 
languages were granted formal primacy but Russian gained the title and status 
of the “language of inter-nationality communication”, which in fact was the state 
language24, and to an increasing degree the administrative language across the 
country. As time passed a concept appeared that the Russian language is the “sec-
ond native language” of citizens of the USSR, which corresponded to the thesis 
about the emergence of the “Soviet nation, the new historical community of peo-
ples”. In Ukraine this process was met with a weaker resistance than in Baltic or 
Transcaucasus republics mainly because the two languages were close to each 
other and because of the huge number of Russian immigrants. In consequence, 
the Ukrainian language was systematically ousted from all spheres of social life. 
The dominance of the Russian language in the life of non-Russian communities 
was encouraged by the fact that Russian was the language of the majority of the 
population of the USSR, the only language used in the army and a natural lin-
gua franca on great industrial building sites which grouped together migrants 
from various regions. Russian teaching was also compulsory in all schools 
with non-Russian language used for teaching and, since two languages from 
within the USSR were not taught, children from schools for minorities (e.g. 
Polish schools in Lithuania or Ukraine) did not learn the “titular” language of 
their particular republic. 
In line with the last Soviet census of 1989 Ukraine had 51.5 million inhabitants, 
including 37.4 million Ukrainians (72.7%) and 11.3 million Russians (22.1%)25. 
Among the Ukrainians 32.8 million (84.3%) considered Ukrainian to be their 
native language, for 4.6 million (5.6%) it was Russian, whereas among Rus-
sians 11.1 million (98.9%) declared that Russian was their native language and 
only 0.2 million said it was Ukrainian. Additionally, 23.2 million Ukrainians 
24 The USSR constitution of 1977 did not define the state language or the official language. 
25 Here and further in the text I overlook data on other declarations concerning nationality 
and language. 
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claimed that they “speak Russian fluently” and 3.7 million Russians said the 
same about Ukrainian26. 
According to the Ukrainian census of 200127 Ukraine had 48.4 million inhabitants, 
including 37.5 million Ukrainians (77.8%) and 8.3 million Russians (17.3%). Among 
Ukrainians 85.2% recognised Ukrainian as their native language and 14.8% said 
it was Russian, whereas among Russians 95.3% declared it was Russian and only 
3.9% said it was Ukrainian (absolute figures were not published). The question 
about the command of a second language was not asked in that census28.
diagram 1. Ukraine’s ethnic-linguistic structure according to censuses from 
1989 and 2001
Source: Natsyonalny sostav naseleniya SSSR po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya, Moscow 1991; 
www.ukrcensus.gov.ua
As can be seen, within a decade the nation-state identification has substantial-
ly increased. Such an important decline in the number of “census-recorded” 
Russians cannot be explained solely by migration processes. It is rather due to 
some opportunist Ukrainians and people with unstable national identity who 
declared Russian nationality under the USSR but Ukrainian identity in the re-
cent census, in several cases also on opportunist grounds. Similarly – and for 
similar reasons – the language-state identification also intensified. 
26 After: Natsyonalny sostav naseleniya SSSR po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya, 
Moscow 1991, p. 78–79.
27 Another census is scheduled for December 2012, therefore its results in the area of interest 
to us will be made available not earlier than in the second half of 2013. 
28 After: www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results, visited at 4.08.2004. 
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However, answers are dependent on the questions asked. Neither Soviet cen-
suses nor the Ukrainian one admitted the declaration of Soviet nationality or 
dual nationality or language identification, whereas sociological research in-
dicates that such options have occurred and are still present. In 2002 as many 
as 13% of Ukrainian respondents considered themselves above all citizens of 
the former USSR (41% saw themselves as citizens of Ukraine, 3% as members 
of their nation/ethnic group; the remaining respondents declared the pri-
macy of regional identifications)29. In a different survey 16% of the respond-
ents thought of themselves as connected mainly with Soviet culture (56% with 
Ukrainian culture, 11% with Russian culture and 7% with European culture)30. 
Andrew Wilson quotes data which shows that only 56% of those surveyed per-
ceive themselves as “Ukrainians only”, 11% as “Russians only”, whereas almost 
27% qualified themselves as “both Ukrainian and Russian”31. The case is simi-
lar with the language: 16% of Ukrainian respondents recognise that Ukrainian 
and Russian are their native languages to an equal extent (52% declare only 
Ukrainian, 31% only Russian)32. 
diagram 2. How Ukrainians identify themselves
Source: Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the company Socis; 
Zerkalo Nedeli, no 31, 2006
29 The research was conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences 
of Ukraine and the company Socis, after: Den, 11.12.2002.
30 After: Lyudmila Shpangina, O strane, gosudarstve i grazhdanakh w perekhodnom voz-
raste, Zerkalo Nedeli, no 31, 2006.
31 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, New Haven and London 2000, p. 219.
32 After: L. Shpangina, op. cit.
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In the light of what is mentioned above and also the body of other sociological 
research, not referred to here, the issues are however quite different than 
presented in the last census. According to various research regarding the na-
tive language at the beginning of the 21st century over half (52–65%) of those 
surveyed indicated Ukrainian, one third (32–36%) said it was Russian and 
the remainder mentioned languages of national minorities, however one re-
search recorded 2% of people who hesitated with their declaration33. On the 
other hand, there was a fairly even three-way split of respondents who de-
clared the use of Ukrainian, the use of Russian or the use of both languages 
depending on the circumstances in everyday life (that is family life34). Both 
divisions are quite stable and the disparities between particular research 
seem to stem from the use of different methodologies, not the volatility of 
social options. 
Long-term research reveals that the percentage of citizens using only 
Ukrainian in their family life grew from 37 to 42% between 1992 and 2010, 
the percentage of those who used only Russian decreased from 39 to 35% and 
the share of those using both languages declined from 32 to 22%. Neverthe-
less, the percentage of Ukrainians declaring the use of Ukrainian at home at 
the same time fell from 51 to 42% and the percentage of those who used Rus-
sian more than doubled from 13 to 28%35. Results of long-term research into 
language preferences are however slightly different; its respondents were 
asked not about their native language or which language they used daily but 
which language they chose (which language was the most comfortable to 
speak). Here we can observe a very stable division into almost equal parts: 
44% declared the use of Ukrainian in 1991 and 46% in 1998; the use of Russian 
over this period fell slightly from 56% to 54%, whereas the percentage of those 
stating Ukrainian was never higher than 49% and those stating Russian was 
never lower than 51%36. 
33 The research conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research, after: Den, 31.08.2000. 
34 The evidence for this is in the results of the research into the language of the inhabitants of 
Kyiv: in 2003 24% of them spoke Ukrainian at home, 8% at work, 4% on the street; 
 http://postup.brama.com/dinamic/i_pub/usual.php?what=8261, visited at 18.03.2003. 
35 Roman Solchanyk, Ukraini 20 rokiv: mova, http://zgroup.com.ua/pront/php?articleid=4844, 
visited at 15.07.2011.
36 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit.
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diagram 3. Everyday language of Ukraine’s citizens
Source: http://www.rb.com.ua
Source: http://www.rb.com.ua
The latest research of Donetsk’s R&B Group point out that in 2011 the Ukrain-
ian language was used at home by 47% of respondents (in 2007 this figure 
stood at 40%), Russian was used by 37% of respondents (37% in 2007), and 
both by 15% (22% in 2007). Ukrainian was used at work and in education by 
45% (41% in 2007), Russian by 35% (35% in 2007), and both by 18% (22% in 
2007), 2% (2% in 2007) of respondents declared that it was difficult to answer 
this question37. 
37 http://www.rb.com.ua/rus/projects/omnibus/7859/, visited at 3.11.2011.
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This research paints a picture of a clear stabilisation and of a shrinking group 
of people who declare themselves to be bilingual. This picture is confirmed by 
a large body of other research; none of it however asks about the capacity to use 
the language in writing or about Surzhyk (a further problem is that it is difficult 
to expect Surzhyk-speakers to admit they speak it in sociological research). 
In western districts where ethnic Russians are a migrant population from the 
post-war time, only 5% of inhabitants considered (according to the census of 
2001) Russian to be their native language. In central districts it is 10% (and 
these are mainly inhabitants of towns), in the east: from 32% in the Dnipro-
petrovsk district to 75% in the Donetsk district38. As far as everyday language is 
concerned, Ukrainian is mainly or exclusively used by 89% of the population in 
western districts, 62% in the central districts, 16% in the eastern districts and 
21% in southern districts39. According to different data in the Donetsk district, 
Russian was used at home by as many as 91% of those surveyed40. The social 
differentiation is also clearly visible: Ukrainian (apart from in the western dis-
tricts) is used above all in villages and in small towns and Russian in big cities. 
Only 13% of the people who declared themselves Russian-speakers in the cen-
sus lived in villages; respectively 47% of Ukrainian-speakers lived in cities41. 
It needs to be added here that sociological research indicates an intensifica-
tion of the regional differentiation of views on language (not only declared lan-
guage preferences) and other symbolic matters, which a section of sociologists 
link with a significant decline in social mobility (between 1990 and 2005 the 
volume of passenger transportation in Ukraine halved)42 and thus a decrease 
in inter-regional contacts43. 
The overwhelming majority of Ukraine’s inhabitants claim they know Ukrain-
ian and Russian well. In a 2002 survey 74% of Ukrainians claimed they knew 
Ukrainian well and 82% claimed they knew Russian well. Results from the 
38 Vitaliy Nakhmanovych, Dynamika etnonatsionalnykh protsesiv v Ukraini i zavdannya 
derzhavnoyi etnopolityky [in:] Aktualni pytannya vitchyznianoyi etnopolityky: shlahy 
modernizatsii, vrakhuwannya mizhnarodnoho dosvidu, Kyiv, 2004, p. 94.
39 After: L. Shpangina, op. cit. 
40 Ukraina dla rossiyan, Polityka i Kultura, no 25, 2000. 
41 Russkiy yazyk w Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit.
42 L. Shpangina, op. cit.
43 It has been/was confirmed by observation that for a significant part of the participants of 
the Orange Revolution that it was the first time they had been to the capital of their own 
country.
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same survey revealed that 22% of respondents claimed they knew Ukrainian 
at a low level with 16% stating the same about Russian. Finally, 4% claimed no 
knowledge of Ukrainian with the figure for Russian standing at 2%’44. How-
ever, with the lack of criteria for a “good command” of a language, this research 
measures only the subjective views of those surveyed. There is a difference be-
tween using a language in everyday life and between knowing it well enough 
in order to use it for learning at an intermediate and higher level, in profes-
sional communication, for purposes of high culture and finally between us-
ing it in private correspondence, court and official documents and for teaching 
this language. 
The majority of Ukraine’s inhabitants do not see the language issue as impor-
tant: in 2001 only 7% thought that it needed to be resolved immediately45 and 
10 years later 70% did not notice this problem at all46. In 2004 44% of respond-
ents claimed that Ukrainian needed the state’s support, 21% thought that was 
Russian to be supported and 28% – that neither of the languages needed any 
support47. A year earlier 27% of those surveyed believed that the position of 
Ukrainian in an independent Ukraine improved, 6% claimed that it was in 
a worse situation, 26% that it had not changed and as many as 30% deemed the 
question formulated in this way artificial, unjustified48. 
The support for granting Russian the status of an equal state language is con-
siderable: in 2002 it was declared by 40% of respondents, whereas 39% said it 
would be appropriate to give it access to the official circuit following the wish 
expressed by local communities and only 17% said it should be entirely re-
moved from this circuit49. Later research shows the stability of this division: in 
2010, while answering a slightly different question, 43% of respondents backed 
the possibility of communicating with officials in Russian in the whole country 
and 34% supported this in selected districts while 17% of those surveyed were 
44 The research conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine and Socis, after: Den, 12.11.2002.
45 People’s Attitude to the Language Situation in Ukraine [in] National Security & Defence 
3/2003, p. 36–39.
46 After: www.from-ua.com/adds/print?phpvoice/ea41a956b72cf, visited at 23.02.2011.
47 Research conducted by the Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology APN Ukraine, after: 
Den, 31.01.2004.
48 Research conducted by the Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology APN Ukraine, after: 
Den, 28.05.2003.
49 Research conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the faculty of soci-
ology at the Kyiv-Mohylan Academy, after: Den, 10.04.2002.
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totally against it50. Certainly, in western districts proponents of full Ukrainisa-
tion are dominant and in eastern districts advocates of Russian being granted 
the status of state language are prevalent. The second option, though, also has 
an important following there.
Research indicates that the majority of Ukraine’s inhabitants have a tolerant-
indifferent attitude to the language question, which is in contrast to the radi-
cal, intolerant approach of the intelligentsia (particularly those from the hu-
manities), both Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking. A substantial section of the 
Russian-speaking community displays a loyal/conformist attitude to the state; 
they want to remain to a large extent Russian-speakers but they are not op-
posed to the Ukrainisation of their children51. 
2. Everyday speech in practice
There is not a problem with communication in everyday life in Ukraine. 
Spoken colloquial Ukrainian and Russian are mutually intelligible, which is 
proven by the common use of both languages in the media (a typical situation: 
a journalist asks questions in Ukrainian and receives replies in Russian; there 
is no translation). Furthermore, no problems are caused by to the fact that 
in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) some members use Ukrainian 
and others use Russian. In sociological research and conversations the argu-
ment that “everybody should speak the language they feel more comfortable 
using” is quite common, and this confirms the lack of difficulties in oral com-
munication. 
Numerous observations (also those made by the author of this text) reveal that 
the clear dichotomy in the use of the colloquial language between the east and 
the west of Ukraine is slowly fading. In the east the demonstration of the in-
ability to use Ukrainian, which was commonplace over a dozen years ago, is 
now disappearing and the use of this language is ceasing to be viewed as “un-
cool”; young people are also becoming aware that a command of Ukrainian is 
a passport to a professional career. At the same time in the west of the country, 
even in Lviv, each year the presence of both Russian and Surzhyk is becom-
ing more visible. Here it is mainly the younger generation that is undergoing 
50 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit.
51 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit., also: Oksana Onishchenko, Igry v patriotov, 
Zerkalo Nedeli, no 43, 2011.
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Russification, to a large extent under the influence of success stories promoted 
by mass culture which in Ukraine is almost exclusively Russian-language. 
The Ukrainisation of education has led to a slight limitation in the use of Surzhyk 
and an increased use of correct Ukrainian On the other hand, though, it has 
contributed to the degradation of the colloquial Russian language in Ukraine. 
Numerous authors, both Ukrainian and Russian, point to the fact that a grow-
ing number of Ukrainian Russians are using an impoverished and distorted 
version of Russian. Until recently language correctness was ensured by contact 
with great literature at school age52. Now with the reduced scope of teaching 
Russian literature, the lowering of the status of literature in school teaching in 
general, degraded forms of language, such as criminal slang, strongly present 
in popular songs (so called “popsa” and “shanson”), become more dominant. On 
the other hand more and more people share language “laziness” or negligence, 
being content to speak in a merely comprehensible way. 
In Ukraine it is difficult to notice signs of concern for language correctness. 
Publications which promote language correctness (except for school manuals) 
are rare, style guides in the press are also rare (they are mainly seen in the na-
tionalist press which does not promote the standard Ukrainian linguistic norm 
but the Galician version of the language with the clear intention of eliminating 
words and expressions present in both Ukrainian and Russian). The majority 
of politicians and other public figures (with the exception of intellectuals) use 
poor Ukrainian in the media, in some cases it borders on Surzhyk; “TV” Russian 
is not much better. 
3. Schools 
In 1991 the numbers of pupils in primary and secondary schools studying in 
Ukrainian and Russian were more or less equal, the regional differentiation 
was however enormous: from 97.6% children in the Ternopil district to 3.3% 
in the Donetsk district studied in Ukrainian53. For all children from schools 
where subjects were taught in Ukrainian (as well as minority schools) it was 
compulsory to learn Russian and Russian literature, whereas in only a few 
schools which taught in Russian did children study Ukrainian. 
52 Compare e.g. the opinion of Myroslav Popovych, the head of the Institute of Philoso-
phy at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (http://life.pravda.com.ua/cul-
ture/2011/05.25/79321/view_print, visited at 30.05.2011).
53 Piotr Eberhardt, op. cit., p. 247, complete data for each district. 
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In the following years there was a sharp increase in the number of schools 
which taught in Ukrainian (in general this was due to the transformation of 
the Russian-language schools into Ukrainian-language ones or the establish-
ment of Ukrainian-language classes in Russian-language schools). In 1999 as 
many as 67.4% of children were taught in Ukrainian54 and not all of them (al-
though still the majority) learnt Russian as a subject. In 2010 the percentage of 
pupils studying in Ukrainian grew to 82.1%55. In the west and the centre of the 
country Russian-language schools disappeared almost entirely: in 16 districts 
of this part of Ukraine in 2010 merely 26 schools which taught in Russian re-
mained and they were attended by 2.7% pupils from these districts. In Kyiv, 
a city of 3 million where at least half of the population is Russian-speaking, 
only six such schools remain. In the eastern and southern districts the num-
ber of pupils attending Russian-speaking schools dropped to 50.5%56. Except 
for the eastern and southern districts the number of children who are being 
taught in Russian is much lower than the percentage of the population which 
declare Russian nationality (we do not know, however, if this is also lower 
than the percentage of children from Russian families). Only in Donbas are 
the Russian-language schools clearly dominant but even there, for example in 
the town of Krasny Luch (the Luhansk district), at the beginning of 2011 there 
were 11 schools which taught in Ukrainian and four which taught in Russian57. 
This situation sparked off protests from local Russian-speaking communities 
and caused politicians with a pro-Russian cultural orientation (which is not 
necessarily equivalent to the pro-Moscow political and state orientation, al-
though this is frequently the case) to take preventative measures. After Vik-
tor Yanukovych won the election, the ministry of education was taken over 
by well-known Russophile Dmytro Tabachnyk who supports an increase 
in the number of schools teaching in Russian in places “where parents wish 
so”. At the same time he leaves the majority of decisions in the hands of dis-
trict governments which for economic reasons are seeking to limit the overall 
number of schools (for instance in Donetsk there are currently 64,500 pupils 
but 139,000 places in schools) but first they want to close down Ukrainian-
speaking schools (in the east) or Russian-speaking schools (in the west)58. Pro-
tests against the closures of schools in general (in defence of the professional 
54 Volodymyr Lytvyn, Ukraina na mezi tysiacholit, Kyiv, 2000, p. 287.
55 Roman Solchanyk, op. cit.
56 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit.
57 Donetschyna mozhe zalyshytys bez ukrainskykh shkil?, Holos Ukrainy, 11.02.2011.
58 Ibid.
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interests of teachers and convenience for parents, a phenomenon also known 
in other countries) were backed by the intellectuals and politicians who de-
fended the “language status quo”. As a result, the authorities withdrew from 
closing down part of the schools. Nevertheless, the problem was not settled: 
the optimisation of the network of schools in Ukraine, where for over 15 years 
the population has been decreasing naturally, is inevitable and the pressure to 
increase the opportunities for learning in Russian seems to be mounting. 
In 2007 standardised school leaving exams, carried out outside schools, were 
introduced in Ukraine, exclusively in Ukrainian (earlier they were organised 
by schools in the language in which they taught); similarly, Ukrainian became 
the language used for entrance exams at universities. This move was met with 
vehement protests from teachers – again not on “language” grounds but be-
cause school leaving exams were a source of corruption rent. Minister Tabach-
nyk, despite pressure, did not eliminate this form of exams; he did, however, 
make it possible to take them as well as entrance exams at colleges in seven 
minority languages59. At the same time, taking Russian at the school leaving 
exam became obligatory in 201260. 
A huge impact both on the education system and the development of pupils’ 
cultural identity comes from the way Russian literature is taught. Until 2000 
in schools in Ukraine three subjects were taught: Ukrainian literature, Rus-
sian literature and foreign literature. The inclusion of Russian literature in 
classes on world literature lessons (taught usually in Ukrainian) diminished 
the extent to which it was known and did not influence the level of knowledge 
of Ukrainian literature. This added to the limitation of the teaching of Russian 
and further contributed to the above mentioned lowering of the level of every-
day Russian used by young Ukrainians61. Currently, there are plans not only to 
59 Crimean-Tatar, Moldovan, Polish, Hungarian, Russian and Romanian (the resolution of the 
Education Minister no. 946 of 8.08.2011, link on the website: http://www.mon.gov.ua/index.
php/ua/pro-ministerstvo/normativno-pravova-baza/normativno-pravova-baza-diyalnos-
ti-ministerstva?start=68, visited at 8.11.2011). This solution gives preference to Russian in 
an evident way and when the possibilities of the Ukrainian education system are taken into 
consideration it grants certain privileges to Hungarians and Romanians, however only at 
several colleges in their original regions.
60 In line with the above quoted resolution relating to the mock school leaving exam from 2012 
the following subjects are obligatory: Ukrainian language and literature, Russian (without 
Russian literature), a foreign language (English, French, Spanish or German), mathematics, 
history of Ukraine, geography, biology, physics and chemistry.
61 This effect was compounded by the introduction of generally poor Ukrainian translations 
of the leading works of Russian literature.
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separate these subjects again (which can be seen as justified, at least in Rus-
sian-speaking schools) but also to enable Ukrainian literature to be included in 
the course on world literature, which would lead to a complete marginalisation 
of the national literature. 
4. State Institutions
Unlike in everyday communication, when it comes to the written command of 
language, the language used in legal documents, the courts and public admin-
istration offices there are serious problems. The fact that one does not know 
an appropriate term or mistakes a Ukrainian word for a Russian one can and 
does cause misunderstandings which have legal implications. It seems, how-
ever, that the battle to enable Russian to be used in the official circuit is being 
waged not in the interest of citizens/applicants but officials, judges etc. who 
grew used to using Russian and who do not want to change their habits. 
Since gaining independence Ukraine has tolerated the fact that the local govern-
ments and administration in the eastern and southern districts continued using 
Russian, although it was an explicit breach of law. Only after the Constitutional 
Court’s verdict of 199962 did the “Ukrainisation” of the local governments and ad-
ministration accelerate, even though in places where the Russian-speaking pop-
ulation is dominant the language of communication between these officials and 
citizens remains Russian and the language used during trials in court is almost 
always chosen by the parties involved. However, until 2004 those processes were 
slow, evolutive (to a certain extent linked with the rejuvenation in the ranks of 
officials and judges etc.) and did not cause any major objections. 
The situation changed in 2005 when Viktor Yushchenko started ensuring 
that the real scope of the use of Ukrainian extend. He was doing it, however, 
in an awkward manner placing emphasis not on pragmatic aspects but sym-
bolic ones (a campaign with slogans such as “one nation – one language – one 
Church” or “think in Ukrainian”), which provoked a categorical, negative reac-
tion also from some of his followers. Nearly all Ukrainian commentators (ex-
cept for extreme nationalists) agreed that Yushchenko, by overlooking the fact 
that the Orange Revolution was bilingual and promoted a “voluntary-compul-
sory Ukrainisation”, acted to the detriment of the position of the Ukrainian 
language and culture in Ukraine. 
62 See below, chapter V.2.
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In response to this, in spring 2006 many district and municipal councils in the 
east and south of the country started introducing Russian in the official circuit 
in their districts as the “regional language”63. Nearly all such resolutions were 
repealed by means of court verdicts (at the request of the prosecutor’s office, 
which is subordinated to the president). These verdicts (as with earlier reso-
lutions) did not have a significant impact on the functioning of local govern-
ments and other local authorities. 
After Viktor Yanukovych came to power in February 2010 “Ukrainisation” was 
hampered. In the new law on the judiciary system the use of “regional languag-
es” (which in practice means Russian) was allowed in the work of the courts, 
which is against the both the Constitutional Court’s verdict of 1999 and the civil 
and administrative procedure codes. At the same time local governments again 
started granting Russian the status of a regional language. That time the bulk of 
those resolutions was again repealed by means of court verdicts – as it can be be-
lieved, mainly because such resolutions were “breaking ranks” without waiting 
for regulations at the national level (the present Ukrainian government is clearly 
oriented towards centralism). It is most likely that their intention is that every-
thing will be regulated by the new law on language, which will be implemented 
without haste, probably only after the parliamentary election of 201264. 
At the same time Ukraine’s present central government is extending the scope 
and increasing the quality of the use of Ukrainian, at least in its own activity65. 
President Yanukovych, who himself continues to improve his spoken Ukrain-
ian, has for example forced Prime Minister Azarov, who has declared many 
times that he would like to but was not able to learn Ukrainian, to use it in his 
public speeches. In times where the message sent by TV is the main form of 
shaping public opinion the importance of this fact cannot be overstated.
Out of four Ukrainian presidents to date, three (Leonid Kravchuk, Leo-
nid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko) grew up in the Ukrainian-speaking 
environment, however only Kravchuk used Ukrainian in his profession-
al career before 1991. For Viktor Yanukovych Ukrainian is a foreign lan-
guage. Kravchuk as president used good Ukrainian in the public sphere, 
63 In reference to the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. See below, chapter V.3. 
64 See below, chapter V.5. 
65 Compare Raian Menon, The Two Ukraines, GMF Policy Brief, July 2011, http://www.gm-
fus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Menon_TwoUkraines_Jul11.pdf, visited at 
2.11.2011.
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the Ukrainian spoken by Kuchma can be described as correct and more 
strongly “Russified” (as prime minister in 1992–1993 he spoke mainly Rus-
sian). Yushchenko avoided speaking Russian, his Ukrainian was however 
not meticulous and was full of Russicisms. Yanukovych, who started learn-
ing Ukrainian only as prime minister (approximately in 2004), now speaks 
it correctly and quite freely. 
The present chairman of the Ukrainian parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn and 
his two deputies, communist Adam Martyniuk and Mykola Tomenko from 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, have grown up in a Ukrainian-speaking en-
vironment; all three are historians, therefore they have used Ukrainian 
in their work. They all use good Ukrainian in public. For Prime Minister 
Mykola Azarov Ukrainian is a foreign language he knows poorly, which is 
apparent when he cannot read a prepared text. 
Among leading Ukrainian politicians, members of the Party of Regions 
speak mainly Russian, although they use a Ukrainian version of Russian. 
The leaders of the Communists speak similarly, whereas the leaders of op-
position parties (Our Ukraine, Batkivshchyna, the Front for Change etc.) 
and the People’s Party (headed by Lytvyn) use Ukrainian publicly with var-
ying degrees of correctness (from excellent in the case of intellectuals from 
western Ukraine to very clumsy Ukrainian rife with Russicisms in the case 
of politicians from the central and eastern part of the country). 
5. The media
Unlike other areas of language use, the language issue in the media, broadly 
speaking, has rather financial, not political or symbolic, importance. Regula-
tions in this area translate into concrete profits for certain broadcasters, pub-
lishers, distributors etc. and losses for other ones. 
Over the 20 years of Ukraine’s independence there has been a substantial in-
crease in content published in Ukrainian in the press and the electronic media 
but in parallel, however, the availability of them has declined and therefore 
their importance has decreased. The number of press titles has sharply risen 
(only in the first decade – from 1,900 to 4,300) but their average circulation sig-
nificantly fell. A considerable section of the print media is now represented by 
advertising and promotional press. As for the tabloid press, it is dominantly in 
Russian; Ukrainian is used mainly in magazines (monthlies and a part of the 
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weeklies), usually having a small circulation (these are of course also present 
in Russian) and the nationalist press. Certain titles are published in both lan-
guage versions (e.g. Kyiv’s daily Den). The majority of the formally nation-wide 
press (including the opinion-forming press) has a small circulation and is not 
available outside the capital66 and in the regions the local press is predominant, 
in western districts and partly in central ones it is in Ukrainian and in the 
rest of the country in Russian67. Both daily newspapers circulated nationally, 
Segodnya and Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine, are published in Russian and 
there is no equivalent daily published in Ukrainian68. 
Currently 90% of the annual circulation of magazines and 70% of newspapers 
are published in Russian69. Since Ukraine’s print media (despite advertising 
and partly the tabloid press) in the overwhelming majority are not financed 
through their sales and advertisements, it can be assumed that the fact that 
certain titles are sustained in this or another language version depends on the 
preferences and/or political goals of their owners. 
The situation is different in case of the electronic media; it is irrelevant to com-
pare it with the situation from before 1991 because of the scope of their devel-
opment during the last 20 years. TV stations and FM radio stations are meant 
to make profits, above all from advertising and their possible number is lim-
ited by the available transmission frequencies. As is not the case with the print 
media, in Ukraine numerous foreign TV channels, above all Russian ones, are 
also available (in cable networks or through satellite). Therefore the majority 
of conflicts related to regulating language issues must be seen as an element of 
the battle the broadcasters are fighting for their place on air and on the adver-
tising market, not over the opportunity for influencing the awareness of view-
ers (the latter may be the main goal of the political TV and radio stations which 
66 With the exception of the dailies Holos Ukrainy and Uriadovy Kuryer which are instruments 
of, respectively, the parliament and the government and are aimed at state and local admin-
istration officials. 
67 For instance in the Luhansk district only one magazine in Ukrainian is issued, the niche 
Kozatska Varta, an instrument of one of the local Cossack organisations (Iryna Mahrytska, 
Kudy tiahne Ukrainy neukrainske kozatstvo?”, Shlakh Peremohy, no 47, 2011). 
68 Until 2004 this function was fulfilled by Silski Visti, a newspaper aimed at the rural popula-
tion, it had few pages and presented a very low standard in terms of content. It later lost its 
mass nationwide character. 
69 www.unian.net/ukr/print/428977, available from 4.04.2011, also Irina Kushnir, Ukraina 
Moloda, 9.11.2011, quoted after: Nashe Slovo, no. 47, 2011. 
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play a marginal role on the media market and are supported by their owners as 
is the case with “5 Kanal”). 
According to the recent data, 47% of the overall broadcasting time of the eight 
main TV channels was occupied by programmes broadcast in Russian, 31% by 
bilingual programmes and 22% by programmes in Ukrainian70 (there are no 
equivalent data for radio). This results mainly from the fact that TV is focused 
on viewers from towns and cities with an average and lower than average edu-
cation, i.e. the consumers of advertising. This group, except for in the towns 
and cities of western Ukraine, is mainly Russian-speaking or Surzhyk-speak-
ing and undisclosed marketing research apparently points to the fact that 
the removal of advertisements in Ukrainian does not affect the effectiveness 
of an advertising campaign71. Furthermore, as advertisers only exceptionally 
run campaigns exclusively on the Ukrainian market, the abandonment of the 
Ukrainian version means considerable savings (it was not by accident that one 
of the demands presented by the National Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Council of Ukraine to Russian channels was to broadcast exclusively adver-
tisements paid for on Ukrainian territory). 
Actions such as the order from 2008 to remove the main Russian channels from 
Ukrainian cable networks have to be seen in this context. It was mainly about 
the right to broadcast the Eurovision contest and the related colossal proceeds 
from advertisements; Ukrainian TV bought exclusive rights to broadcast this 
event in Ukraine, whereas the broadcast from Russian TV was also to be avail-
able in cable networks72. This issue was however granted political significance, 
also in Russia which perceived this ban as an act of discriminating against the 
Russian-speaking community and used it as another motive to attack President 
Yushchenko. Incidentally, it was above all distributors of satellite reception 
sets who profited from the temporary (and only partly enforced) ban on the 
broadcasting of ORT and RTR TV channels which are very popular in Ukraine. 
The story is slightly different with FM radio stations. In this case the fight 
for local frequencies is much fiercer and large companies taking part in it are 
70 Irina Kushnir, op. cit. 
71 The situation is slightly different in outdoor advertising where the pressure from the gov-
ernment and local administration “persuaded” advertisers to Ukrainise the displayed ma-
terials. 
72 Such conflicts, including those regarding important sporting events, are not specific only 
to Ukraine. 
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trying to oust small, local ones (usually the “Ukrainian-music-broadcasting”73 
stations usually belong to this group). Attempts at introducing (compatible 
with EU norms) quotas on the “domestic production” in the media have not 
brought about any important results: broadcasters provide the explanation 
that “you cannot force listeners to listen to something that they do not want 
to” and “orchestrated” voices of the listeners who demanded Russian songs to 
be broadcast74.
In Ukraine one can sometimes hear that the deluge of Russian “popsa” and 
“shanson” and the promotion of the idols of the older generation (Yosif Kob-
zon, Alla Pugachova) is an element of Russian “spiritual aggression” against 
Ukraine, that is – in more politically correct terms – an element of Russian 
soft power. However, even without the hypothetical inspiration from Russia, 
Ukrainian FM radio broadcasters would act in a similar manner, dictated by 
the situation on the market. They could possibly be eager to broadcast Ukrain-
ian “popsa” but no such music is being produced. 
The domination of “popsa” which promotes slang and a careless way of speak-
ing (and also advertisements which have a similar impact) has a decidedly neg-
ative impact on the language situation in Ukraine: it contributes to the blur-
ring of the linguistic norm, both that of Ukrainian and of Russian, and lowers 
the average language competence of the population in Ukraine. 
6. Cinema
Between 2006 and 2010 the issue of dubbing cinema films was the subject 
of a great dispute in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government tried to force dis-
tributors to ensure that a half of the copies of foreign films were dubbed in 
Ukrainian or had Ukrainian voice-over and not – as had previously been the 
case – only Ukrainian subtitles in parallel with Russian dubbing/voice-over; 
and even that was not always done. The dispute concerned not Russian cin-
ema but rather the common practice of screening the blockbusters of world 
cinema in Ukraine with Russian dubbing or subtitles. The order to have films 
73 I have introduced this neologism as this dispute is not about the language used by radio pre-
senters but about the country from which the broadcast music production comes. Ukrain-
ian papers in general use the term “national audiovisual production”; a rather nonsensical 
term, “Ukrainian-speaking music”, also appears. 
74 The business nature of this dispute is confirmed by, among other sources, the article of 
Lesya Ganzha, Vmesto muzyki, Zerkalo Nedeli, no 40, 2011.
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dubbed in Ukrainian brought about significant losses to distributors, however, 
contrary to the propaganda they used, it did not affect the number of viewers 
in cinemas (in large cities films were usually screened in both language ver-
sions at the same time). Eventually, the regulation which imposed dubbing was 
removed and this move enabled copies of films made in Russia to be brought in 
once again (and also those which were ordered in other countries where the 
production costs are lower than in Ukraine). Recent data indicate that 69% of 
films shown in cinemas in Ukraine are dubbed in Ukrainian or have a Ukrain-
ian voice-over and the remainder are subtitled in Ukrainian (and often there 
is Russian dubbing or voice-over in the background)75. 
This dispute is more about business than culture. The dubbing of a cinema film 
costs on average US$ 25,00076 and there are several premieres a week77. It is 
therefore a major cost for distributors and it brings great profits to few dubbing 
companies (according to sources in Ukraine there is only one such company, 
B&H Film Distribution, the largest film distributor in the country). Dubbing is 
also a great school for young actors and a source of income for them, which is 
certainly not insignificant in a situation where Ukrainian cinema is in ruin. 
7. Books
Ukraine’s independence has brought about a decrease in the availability of 
books in the country, which has also triggered a fall in readership. The num-
ber of published titles has grown (in 1990–2001 from 7,000 to 10,000) but their 
overall circulation declined in the same period from 170 to 48 million annually, 
including books published in Ukrainian – from 95 to 29 million)78. Even when 
one bears in mind the fact that Soviet propaganda literature stopped being 
printed, this fall is dramatic. One must also remember that a large part of the 
75 Irina Kushnir, op. cit. 
76 Oksana Klymonchuk, Khto lobiyuye interesy rosijskykh dystrybyutoriv v Ukraini, mate-
rial from the UNIAN agency, 13.05.2010.
77 In the first 10 months of 2011 183 foreign films were shown in Ukrainian cinemas (www.
unian.net/ukr/print/472577), visited at 6.12.2011.
78 Statystychny Shchorichnyk Ukrainy 2007, Kyiv 2008, p. 499. Later, there was an increase 
in the circulation of published books, up to 56 million copies (18,000 titles) in 2007. How-
ever, the overall circulation of books in Ukrainian amounted to 29 million copies in 2007, 
which is the same as in 2001 (op. cit.). Later data point to 58 million in overall circulation in 
2008, 45 million (22,000 titles) in 2010 and 34 million according to initial data for 2011 (Anna 
Zhuravska, Ukrainskaya kniga yest i budet!, Zerkalo Nedeli, no 48, 2011). 
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books published in Ukrainian are school manuals, legal texts etc., therefore 
Ukrainian literature “for reading” has become even less available. 
However, the real disproportion between the availability of books in Ukrain-
ian and books in Russian is greater as books published in Russia are available 
without any constraints in Ukraine. Russian publishers who operate on the 
huge market of the former USSR have a competitive edge. Their books were 
for a long time cheaper than those printed in Ukraine; only in approximately 
2006 as a result of new customs regulations did they become more expensive. 
This was probably the result of pressure exerted by large Ukrainian publishers 
who issue books in Russian because only they enter in competition with books 
imported from Russia. It is estimated that books in Russian (domestic and im-
ported) currently make up as much as 87% of books sold in Ukraine79. 
The disproportion of availability of books in the two languages is exacerbated 
by the dismal state of Ukrainian bookstores. The number of book stores has 
dramatically fallen, modern bookstore chains are a new phenomenon visible 
only in recent years, there are no nationwide distribution companies (whole-
salers) and the main trade in books has moved to bazaars. In many Ukrainian 
towns (such as Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk) it is even difficult to find book-
stores. This also works against books in Ukrainian (except for school manuals 
etc.): a large bookstore, especially one from a chain, can afford to run the de-
partment with books in Ukrainian or offer Ukrainian books while being aware 
that fewer copies of them will sell in comparison to books in Russian. A mar-
ket stall holder or bookstore owner cannot afford to do this. In consequence, 
for example Lviv is inundated with Ukrainian books (often published due to 
grants, not market forces) which bookstore owners in Kyiv have never even 
heard of. 
According to sociological research, 42% of “active readers” in Ukraine read 
literature in Russian only, 15% – in Ukrainian only and the rest declares that 
they read in both languages (which can mean that in reality they read only in 
Russian)80. It is not known what percentage of the Ukrainian population does 
in fact read literature. 
79 Irina Kushnir, op. cit.
80 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine…, op. cit.
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Ukrainian writers who write in Ukrainian (as there are also Ukrainian writ-
ers who write in Russian81) frequently demand to be granted administrative 
preferences: not only to restrict imports of books from Russia but also to accord 
preferences to literature in Ukrainian. Thus they defend their position and 
revenues (similarly as with singers) but do not pay attention to the fact that 
mass readers are looking for popular literature and such literature is hardly 
ever written in Ukrainian. It is available exclusively in Russian, even if their 
authors are Ukrainian. They write in Russian not only because they have a bet-
ter command of it: many of them from the very beginning count on Russian 
publishers who offer higher writer’s fees corresponding to much higher cir-
culations. Several attempts at publishing popular literature (mainly fantasy 
and action/crime literature) have failed due to the competitive advantage of 
publishers of books written in Russian (including domestic publishers). 
The fact remains that it is not “high” literature but popular literature that 
is read by the wider public. The reader expects books which tell simple love, 
crime and fantasy stories in simple language. They shape society’s language 
imagery (together with the electronic media). In bilingual Ukraine it has a spe-
cial significance: the lack of popular literature in the state language discour-
ages its use in contexts outside officialdom.
81 For instance, novelist Andrey Kurkov, whose books are translated in countries such as Ger-
many and Poland, playwright and novelist Anatoliy Krym (also known in Poland) or the 
group of popular fantasy writers – Maryna and Serhiy Dyachenko, Vladimir Vasilyev and 
other writers. Part of the latter also write in Ukrainian.
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III. LANGUAGE AS A FIELD OF SYMBOLIC AND IDENTITY 
RIVALRY 
Language is an important factor in determining people’s national identity and 
an element of the “symbolic identity” of a modern state. We know many ex-
amples from the history of battles over language dominance between the state 
and part of its population; one of them is the Germanisation efforts of the Ger-
man state, other examples are: the long-term – dating back to the 16th century 
– fight the British Crown had with Welsh, the battle pursued by Czechs over 
the recognition of the existence of the “Czechoslovak language” by Slovaks, 
and Croats striving to emancipate their language from “Serbo-Croat”. In the 
historical East Slavic language area this dispute, fuelled on the one hand by 
relatively small language differences and on the other hand by political ambi-
tions, is still ongoing. The language issue is today the main area of “symbolic 
and identity” rivalry between Kyiv and Moscow and it does not seem this situ-
ation is about to change. 
The genesis of Ukrainian is the subject of contention. Closest to the truth 
is the view that until the 13th century in the East Slavic area there existed 
quite uniform, although dialectically differentiated, Old East Slavic (Rus 
Language82) which was common for the descendants of present-day Rus-
sians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. It had its literary (written) form, the 
local variety of Old Church Slavic. In the later period particular dialectic 
groups became more and more independent and under the influence of po-
litical factors and theological disputes in the 16th and 17th centuries admin-
istrative languages – Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian – appeared and 
were used both in the state and the Church circuits. The literary languages 
in the modern meaning emerged later: Russian in the second half of the 
18th century, Ukrainian – towards the end of 18th century and the first half 
of the 19th century, both were formed on the basis of the earlier “adminis-
trative” languages. Contemporary Belarusian was established only in the 
19th century on the basis of folk dialects, without any link to the extinct 
Belarusian “administrative” language83. 
82 The term “Rus Language” is not widely adopted, its introduction is however needed since 
the lexical similarity between “ruskiy yazyk” (Old East Slavic) and “russkiy yazyk” (con-
temporary Russian) is the subject to manipulation in ongoing linguistic and political dis-
putes. The terms “Ruthenian Language” and “Rusyn Language” refer to other stages of the 
development of East Slavic languages. 
83 After: Franciszek Sławski, Języki słowiańskie, [in] Języki indoeuropejskie, ed. Leszek Bed-
narczuk, PWN Warsaw 1988, p. 948–964.
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This view is however not commonly accepted, national interpretations of the 
genesis of the languages differ considerably and these differences are politi-
cally significant. The majority of Russian researchers consider the Rus lan-
guage to be Old Russian and think that modern Russian comes in the simple 
and uninterrupted line from the Rus language (while minimising or ignoring 
the influence of the Finnish, Turk-Tatar and German languages on its devel-
opment) and it is the only language that is its “legitimate heir”. At the same 
time they move the emergence of Ukrainian to the 18th and 19th centuries and 
ascribe it to the influence of Polish and Polish political power. Several au-
thors go as far as to claim that Ukrainian developed only in the 19th century 
in East Galicia. As for Ukrainian researchers, they argue that the emergence 
of Ukrainian from the East Slavic language area occurred as early as between 
the 10th and 12th centuries84 and in the 14th century there already existed dis-
tinct Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian languages. 
There are also extreme, anti-scientific and even absurd interpretations 
such as the one claiming that “Russian and Ukrainian developed practi-
cally at the same time in the territory of Ukraine in the period beginning 
in the 10th century. Both languages are autochthonous to Ukrainian lands 
and are not the languages of migrants or conquerors; they have peacefully 
co-existed for over 500 years”85. On the other hand, there are views that 
Ukrainians come from the people of Neolithic Trypillian culture identi-
fied (without any justification) with Pre-Indo-Europeans, therefore (sic!) 
Ukrainian is one of the most “aboriginal” and the oldest Indo-European 
language (the Ukrainian pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai World Expo was 
subjected to this concept). 
This dispute has political significance due to the identification of language 
with nation: a nation which does not have its own language cannot exist, a lan-
guage not anchored in a nation cannot exist either. The second premise, which 
is widely recognised in discussions on this topic both in Ukraine and in Rus-
sia, is that there is a continuity of the existence of contemporary nations from 
their oldest forms of their development, which are possible to accept. In the 
light of this concept if the Ukrainian nation (the Russian nation, any other na-
tion) exists, it must have existed in its present from since the very beginning 
of history. If there existed the Rus Language = Old Russian, there was also such 
84 Compare e.g. Oleksandr Paliy, Ukrainska mova: krapochka nad nashym ‘i’, www.unian.
net/ukr/print467427, visited at 10.11.201. 
85 www.r-u.org.ua/analit/-/4220-news?tmpl+component&preview, available from 23.03.2011.
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a nationality which has developed into the modern Russian nation. Ukrain-
ian and Belarusian (both the languages and nations) did not ‘emerge’ but have 
rather been severed from the “Rus/Russian trunk” and whose distinctiveness 
is an unnatural state and could/must be reversed. 
If, on the other hand, the Rus Language is in fact Old Ukrainian86, the Ukrain-
ian nation is not only distinct from Russian from the very beginning but it ap-
pears to be the first of the East Slavic nations which Russians have “split off 
from” and therefore the Russians are the “younger brothers” (both in terms 
of chronology and “honour”). It is the reversed image of the above mentioned 
Russian view, although its implications are merely nationalist and not impe-
rial (they do not feature the demand of the “re-Ukrainisation” of Russians). The 
contention outlined above, still alive in historical and political discussions, is 
an important element of Ukraine’s ongoing dispute over the ideological (sym-
bolic) dominion which substantially impacts the way the language issue is 
thought about in Ukraine and possible solutions to it. 
Ukrainian intellectuals and nationalistically-oriented politicians for a long 
time did not have any influence on Kyiv’s politics since the government focused 
on pragmatic matters and did not understand the need to pursue an identity 
policy. The situation changed in 2005 when many nationalists appeared in the 
entourage of President Yushchenko; they overestimated the significance of the 
language issue and called for the Ukrainisation of the language sphere of the 
country. Yushchenko himself, being fascinated with history in quite an un-
critical manner (e.g. he shares the vision of the Ancient Ukrainian Trypillian 
culture), supported these activities and became involved in them. 
The western Ukrainian way of thinking about the role of language in the state, 
shared by Yushchenko, is well exemplified by his sui generis political legacy – 
the decree of 15 February 2010. The decree introduced the Concept of the State 
Language Policy87, according to which “Ukrainian as a means of communica-
tion and an intellectual expression of one’s personality reflects the autonomy 
of the Ukrainian nation and provides the foundation for its spirituality and 
historical memory” and the “full functioning of the Ukrainian language in all 
aspects of the social sphere in the entire territory of the country is a guarantee 
86 In line with the view of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, first formulated in the classic article of 
1903 “Zvychayna skhema russkoyi istorii y sprava racionalnoho ukladu istorii skhidnioho 
Slovyanstva”.
87 http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/10486.html, visited at 2.11.2011.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
5/
20
12
39
of the Ukrainian nation’s identity and Ukraine’s unity”. The present language 
situation is referred to as “deformed” and resulting from the “wide use of direct 
and implicit coercion” aimed at accelerating the denationalistion of Ukrainians, 
and the “normalisation of the language situation” will be achieved by helping 
Ukrainian to become clearly dominant. Further on the document states: “The 
priority of the state language policy will be to strengthen and develop Ukrainian 
– the decisive factor and the main token of the identity of the Ukrainian nation 
[natsya] whose historical home is the territory of Ukraine, which constitutes 
an absolute majority of Ukraine’s population, which has given the official name 
to the state and is the fundamental system-forming constituent of Ukrainian 
statehood and the Ukrainian Nation [Narod] – citizens of Ukraine of all nation-
alities88. (…) Citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origins, convictions 
or the positions they hold, should know Ukrainian as the language of their citi-
zenship”. After leaving office Yushchenko expressed it in a more brutal way: 
“Only occupants, slaves and fools do not speak the national language”89. 
This approach, coupled with attempts to enforce the observation of the law re-
lating to language among civil servants, and unreasonable measures such as 
attempts at imposing the use of Ukrainian on teachers in their private conver-
sations at work have provoked a response from Russian-speaking circles who 
had been earlier satisfied with the status quo. This reaction was exacerbated 
by the fact that in each electoral campaign the parties canvassing constitu-
ents from eastern and southern Ukraine have been promising to grant Russian 
the status of equal state language (not only the status of official language) and 
therefore to raise its symbolic rank. After the election, however, they do not 
take any steps in this direction. When Viktor Yanukovych and his government 
followed suit, they came under stark criticism from Russian-speaking circles. 
At present the main lobby for this orientation is the Pan-Ukrainian Social Or-
ganisation “Russian-speaking Ukraine”, headed by an influential Member of 
Parliament from the Party of Regions, Vadym Kolesnichenko. The Organisa-
tion’s goals include not only the “development of the Russian language and 
culture as the language and culture of the native population of Ukraine” but 
also the “popularisation of a shared history as the integrating factor for all 
East Slavic nations”, the defence of the canonical Orthodox Church90, the bat-
88 In Ukrainian (and Russian) political context “nationality” means ethnicity, not citizenship. 
89 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/05/15/6199988/view_print, visited at 16.05.2011.
90 That is the fight with the Ukrainian autocephaly, supported by nation-oriented politicians, 
including Yushchenko. 
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tle for the federalisation of the country’s political system and finally the “fight 
with manifestations of racism, xenophobia and discrimination on language 
grounds”91. The way these goals are formulated and the argumentation used 
prove that they do not refer to combating the discrimination of the Russian 
language but rather the Ukrainian national identity itself. 
For Kolesnichenko and his followers there is a close, unambiguous connection 
between Ukrainian and Greek Catholicism (seen as a result of “Western ag-
gression” against Russia) and the anti-Soviet independence movement from 
the of World War II period which is in turn identified with Nazism etc. The Rus-
sophile organisations and circles are opposed to Ukraine’s rapprochement to 
Western structures and strongly support the integration of post-Soviet states. 
The logical consequence of their views is challenging the distinctiveness of the 
Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture and therefore also the existence of 
the nation and the state. The holders of these views do not go that far, possibly 
because of tactical reasons. 
It is worth pointing out that such organisations may easily gain support in 
certain European circles by portraying themselves as the defenders of all 
Ukraine’s national minorities against Ukrainisation and as “the just few” who 
resist the development of the tradition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and 
antisemitism in Ukraine etc. 
Both briefly outlined “identity projects” draw the attention of relatively few 
circles, these are however the elites who make decisions regarding culture. 
They are also an excellent instrument to mobilise voters and neither side will 
thus abandon them. It should not therefore be expected that the heated de-
bate over the language and identity issues will cool down or that a moderate, 
centre-oriented option will be developed. 
91 Kratkiy otchot after 2009-11; link on the website http://www.r-u.org.ua/recomend/4536-
news.html, visited at 2.11.2011.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
5/
20
12
41
IV. RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE DISPUTE
The policy of the Russian Federation is not the subject of this paper. It cannot be 
entirely overlooked, however, because of the constant presence of the Russian 
media in Ukrainian public discussions and actions undertaken by the govern-
ment and other bodies of the Russian Federation in order to influence the situ-
ation in Ukraine, also in the language sphere. 
Russia, while formally accepting the dissolution of the USSR, almost from the 
beginning has tried to hamper the process of a real distancing of post-Soviet 
countries, particularly Belarus and Ukraine, treating them as part of the com-
mon geopolitical and civilisational area. As part of these actions Russia has been 
supporting the direct or indirect presence of the Russian media in Ukraine, 
aiming at maintaining Russian as the main or the only medium of economic, 
scientific and legal co-operation (which means giving the impression that the 
development of the written standard of Ukrainian in these spheres is not nec-
essary) and promoting the vision described above of the exclusive legitimacy 
of the succession of the Russian language/culture/nation to the Rus Language. 
Initially, the media (also Ukrainian versions of Russian newspapers and maga-
zines, of course in Russian) and the natural dominance on the books market, 
particularly in the case of translations (which contributed to the maintenance 
of the role of Russian as the medium of contact with world culture and science), 
were the main channel of Russia’s influence. After 2004 Moscow came to ap-
preciate the importance of non-governmental organisations and started sup-
porting and/or establishing non-governmental organisations which displayed 
a civilisational pro-Russian orientation. At the same time the rapid develop-
ment of the Internet media has given Russia new instruments to exert influ-
ence which are being actively and skilfully used. 
The Russian state has criticised the constraints on teaching Russian and espe-
cially Russian literature in Ukraine many times and has also raised the issue 
of the rights of the Russian-speaking community in official relations. Russia 
decidedly criticised the identity policy (including the language policy) pursued 
by Viktor Yushchenko, later it endorsed propaganda actions taken by Deputy 
Prime Minister Tabachnyk and aimed at a reversal of the changes in the educa-
tion system introduced under Yushchenko. The Russian government has also 
backed the Moscow Patriarchy in its measures taken to counteract centrifugal 
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tendencies in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church92. Crimea has been a subject 
particular interest for Moscow as its population almost exclusively uses Rus-
sian and the Ukrainian-speaking community is composed exclusively of the 
immigrants who arrived there in the last half a century. 
Approximately in 2007 the concept of “russkiy mir” was invented, according to 
which the “area” of the Russian world/peace93 extends also to citizens of other 
countries who speak Russian, learn or teach Russian, “those who have a sin-
cere interest in Russia”. This idea is to be implemented by both the state and the 
Orthodox Church and its activities are set to be coordinated by the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation, established in 2007 and funded from the state budget. 
The scope of this project and the foundation’s statutory activities go far beyond 
the language issues; nevertheless, hampering the Ukrainisation of Ukraine’s 
language sphere is one of its crucial goals. It can therefore be assumed (although 
we do not have any evidence for this) that the foundation organisationally and 
financially supports such organisations as “Russian-speaking Ukraine”. 
Russia equally actively supports organisations of the Russian community in 
Crimea, where Russians make up the vast majority94 and where they in large 
part do not feel a “symbolic” connection with Kyiv. Furthermore, most Crime-
an Tatars and a substantial part of Ukrainians living in Crimea are Russian-
speaking. The existence of the Crimean autonomy makes it more difficult for 
Kyiv to pursue the language policy in this region. It does not, however, consti-
tute a barrier to informal Russian influences. 
92 This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. In this analysis it is important to note that al-
though Ukraine’s “dissident” Orthodox Churches see the use of Ukrainian in church life as 
a fundamental matter, the structures subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchy use it reluc-
tantly, mainly at the request of local congregations. 
93 This duality of meaning is clearly explained in the official ideology of the Russkiy Mir Foun-
dation. Compare www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/fund/about, visited at 2.12.2011.
94 As the data gathered in the census of 2001 indicates, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’s 
population stood at 2.03 million, of whom 58.3% were Russians, 24.3% were Ukrainians and 
12% were Crimean Tatars, the town of Sevastopol had a population of 400,000 people, of 
whom 71.6% were Russians and 22.4% were Ukrainians. 
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V. LEGAL REGULATIONS OF LANGUAGE ISSUES 
1. The Constitution 
The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on 28 June 1996, stated in the pream-
ble that the Ukrainian Nation (Ukrainsky narod) is composed of the citizens of 
Ukraine of all nationalities. It therefore implicitly recognises the multilingual-
ism of this political nation. However, article 10 states that, “The state language 
in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language” and further continues that, “The State 
ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian 
language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine” 
and that, “In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and 
other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed”. Details are 
to be defined by a law which has not been made yet. 
Therefore, the constitution of Ukraine states that Ukrainian is the only state 
language, Russian is only the language of a national minority (the fact that it 
is mentioned separately reflects not the size of this minority but its “honorary 
primacy”) and it is not, as in Soviet law, the language of “inter-ethnic commu-
nication”. At the same time the transitional provisions stated that laws adopted 
prior to this constitution entering into force (also in the Ukrainian Soviet So-
cialist Republic) “are in force where they do not contradict the Constitution of 
Ukraine” (Chapter XV, article 1) but no deadline was given for harmonising the 
legislation with the constitution. Therefore the language regulations to date 
remained in effect (including the law of 1989, commented on below) and it was 
not clear which of its provisions are contradictory to the constitution. 
2. The law on language
The “Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on languages in the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” adopted on 28 October 1989 states that 
the state language in the Ukrainian SSR is Ukrainian and that Russian (along 
with Ukrainian and other languages) has the status of “the language of inter-
ethnic communication” and that the “Ukrainian SSR ensures the free use of 
Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication of the nations of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”. This law does not accord Russian special 
status among the “languages of other nationalities” and it places officials of 
the state administration, the party and other public organisations under the 
obligation to know Ukrainian and Russian and “when necessity arises – also 
another national language” (Art. 6). The possibility of using the language of 
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a minority where the majority of the population belongs to this minority was 
restricted to the level of the basic administrative division (towns and villages). 
At the same time the scope in which the use of Russian (along with and not 
instead of Ukrainian) was admitted in the activity of public institutions was 
defined so broadly that it can be said that it was admitted to be used as the of-
ficial language, although this term is not employed in the law. 
The incompatibility of this law with the Constitution of Ukraine was the rea-
son for the verdict of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 14 December 1999 
which stipulated that “Ukrainian as the state language is the obligatory me-
dium of communication throughout the entire territory of Ukraine by the state 
authority and local authority bodies when exercising their competences (…), 
and also in other public spheres of social life which are regulated by law. (…) 
The teaching language in nurseries, primary, general secondary, vocational 
and technical and higher education establishments, state-owned and com-
munal, is the Ukrainian language. In state-owned and communal educational 
establishments along with the state language (…) languages of national mi-
norities may be used and taught”95. On the basis of this verdict the provisions 
about the exclusive use of Ukrainian in the official circuit were introduced to 
Ukraine’s many legal acts; the work on the new law relating to language, un-
dertaken several times, have not however led to it being adopted, and the old 
law, even though it is widely ignored, remains in force. 
3. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
When Ukraine joined the Council of Europe, it was obliged to adopt the Europe-
an Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (henceforth referred to as the 
Charter96), adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992. Ukraine signed it on 2 May 
1999 and ratified on 15 May 2003 by means of law no. 802-IV97. The fact that the 
Council of Europe insisted Ukraine adopt the Charter can be assessed as a po-
litical error made by the Council of Europe since Ireland, Portugal, Belgium, 
Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all 
95 http://www.ccu.gov.ua/uk/doccatalog/list?currDir=9343, visited at 2.11.2011.
96 http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm. Further quoted from this 
ver sion. 
97 The earlier ratification law of 24 December 1999 was invalidated by the Constitutional Court 
on formal grounds. 
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refused to sign it98. These countries (excepting Portugal) have serious language 
problems and for various reasons did not agree to grant the rights defined by 
the Charter to particular minority languages. For the purpose of this paper 
the position of Ireland is of great importance as this country is struggling with 
an identical problem as Ukraine, which cannot be resolved by the Charter: its 
state language is at the same time the minority language. 
The main objective of the Charter is to protect regional and minority languages 
which are defined by the Charter as “languages that are: (i) traditionally used 
within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group 
numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and (ii) different 
from the official language(s) of that State; it does not include either dialects of 
the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants. Further on, 
the Charter introduces the criterion of the numerical size of the group which 
uses a given language, and the “adoption of the various protective and promo-
tional measures provided for in this Charter” must be “justified” by the size 
of this group and the term “non-territorial languages”, mainly to make it pos-
sible for the Charter to extend to the languages of the Romani people, Yiddish 
and Hebrew. Each signatory country of the Charter independently decides to 
which languages and to what extent it grants the protection provided for by 
the Charter. 
The Charter does not state how large the group has to be in order for it to come 
under the protection of the Charter (several countries applied this protec-
tion to the languages used by groups of over a hundred people or to languages 
which are no longer used at all99). The Charter tacitly leaves it to its signatories 
to define what a language is and what a dialect is as well as to establish which 
groups are migration-based groups and which are not. The assessment of these 
may easily become the matter of political controversies, the more so that lin-
guistics and sociology are not in full agreement on these issues. 
The Charter cannot therefore be applied in a situation where a group which 
uses the state language of the country is a minority within its population (since 
the Charter cannot be the basis for the protection of the state language), nor 
can the protection provided for by the Charter extend to the language tradi-
tionally used by the majority of the country’s population. 
98 Among the Charter’s signatories the following countries have not so far ratified it: Iceland, 
France, Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, and Azerbaijan. 
99 e.g. in Poland – the Karaim and Tatar languages. 
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The authors of the Charter were guided by the analysis of the situation in West-
ern Europe where (except for Belgium and Ireland) in particular countries the 
state/official language is dominant (the language of the main national/ethnic 
community) and where next to the languages of national minorities there are 
also local languages whose speakers do not consider themselves as nationali-
ties (e.g. Lower-German dialects recognised by Germany as regional languages 
or countless Italian dialects). The situation of the post-Soviet states and Yugo-
slavia’s succession states has not apparently been taken into consideration, al-
though the case of Ireland should have provided the opportunity for reflection. 
As a result, the Charter has been ratified by only two post-Soviet countries: 
Armenia and Ukraine. 
The Charter entered into force in Ukraine in 2006. However, in Kyiv one of its 
key categories had been wrongly translated: instead of “minority languages” 
the Ukrainian text refers to the “languages of the minorities” (movy menshyn). 
In this regard Ukraine has declared it will protect the “languages of the fol-
lowing national minorities of Ukraine: Belarusians, Gagauz, Greeks, Jews, 
Crimean-Tatars, Moldovans, German, Poles, Russians, Romanians, Slovaks 
and Hungarians” and thus it has declared it will protect all these languages 
throughout the whole Ukrainian territory (the majority of the countries which 
are signatories of the Charter confine the protection of regional languages to 
their home regions). What draws attention is the fact that the Romani people 
have been overlooked (which is the result of Ukraine’s not having adopted the 
provisions relating to non-territorial languages) as well as the lack of clarity of 
the terms “the language of the Greek and Jewish minority”100. 
Ukraine, having made use of the opportunities provided for by the Charter, has 
not adopted certain language rights, including the possibility to conduct trials 
in languages of the minorities in courts or using these languages by the state 
administration bodies (they are replaced by the guaranteed right to have an 
interpreter). This move was intended to preserve – in line with the verdict of 
the Constitutional Court discussed above – the monopoly of Ukrainian in the 
administration of state bodies. 
100 We give more information on Ukraine’s national and ethnic minorities in the Appendix. 
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4. The new draft law on language 
Drafts laws relating to language questions have been submitted to the Supreme 
Council of Ukraine (the Parliament) many times; a section of them were fo-
cused on ensuring the primacy of Ukrainian while others focused on guaran-
teeing the primacy of Russian. The most serious draft to date has been the doc-
ument submitted by the Party of Regions in September 2010101, then corrected 
in part under the influence of the critical comments made by the Venice Com-
mission102. The main points of this criticism were: the granting of excessive 
protection to Russian, the lack of a guarantee of due protection to Ukrainian 
as the state language and the lack of clarity of the term “native language / ridna 
mova”. The Venice Commission equally emphasised the necessity of improv-
ing the criteria of ethnic and language identification in the forthcoming cen-
sus and asked for protection to be extended to an additional three languages: 
Karaim, Krymchak and Rusyn. The final draft of the law “On the rules of the 
state language policy”103 was submitted in August 2011 and it can be expected 
that it will be brought under discussion at the Supreme Council in spring 2012. 
The draft guarantees Ukrainian the role of the only state language, treats Rus-
sian as one of the “regional languages or languages of minorities” without ac-
cording it a special position as had been the case in the draft of 2010. The lat-
ter stated that “Russian is the native language or the language used daily by 
most citizens” and referred to the “historically determined Russian-Ukrain-
ian bilingualism” as an important element of Ukraine’s national heritage. It 
was apparently assumed that there is no need to accentuate the special role of 
Russian since all the rights granted to speakers of regional and minority lan-
guages will apply above all to Russian-speakers. It cannot be ruled out that the 
fact that Russian has not been given the status of the “second state language” 
stems from the reflection that in such a case it would no longer be protected 
under the Charter. Nevertheless, the Party of Regions still has the slogan “one 
nation – two languages” in its electoral agenda and demands the introduction 
of the second state language; it seems that its leadership is not unanimous in 
this matter. 
101 No.1015-3; http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=38474, visited at 
2.11.2011.
102 Opinion no. 605/2010 of 7.01.2011, http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Opinion_
ef.asp?L=E&OID=605, visited of 15.09.2011.
103 No. 9073, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=41018, visited at 
2.11.2011.
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The draft for the first time clearly defines the state language, the language 
group etc. The native language is the “first language which a person has learnt 
in early childhood”. This definition in fact removes the rights relating to lan-
guage of most small minority groups which are entirely or almost entirely Rus-
sified. The norm which states that “everyone has the right to freely choose the 
language which they consider to be their native language” is in stark contrast 
to this definition. 
The draft enables regional languages and the languages of minorities to be used 
as administrative languages by local authorities and public administration, in-
cluding the use of them in correspondence between government bodies and 
also for legal acts to be issued in them. The daft guarantees the right to free-
ly choose the language of instruction but with the reservation that teaching 
Ukrainian is compulsory “to the extent which is sufficient to ensure integra-
tion in Ukrainian society” and it is clearly stated that the Ukrainian language 
and its literature can be taught only in Ukrainian. The issues of language pro-
portions in the media and the question of whether or not to introduce dubbing, 
voice-over or subtitles in screened films are left to be decided by their owners 
and language regulations regarding advertising were removed. The exclusive-
ness of Ukrainian has been maintained only in the army. 
The draft law extends to the following languages: Russian, Belarusian, Gagauz, 
Yiddish, Crimean-Tatar, Moldovan, German, Modern Greek, Armenian, Pol-
ish, Romani, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim and Krymchak104. The prereq-
uisite for the introduction one of these languages to be used in parallel with 
the state language is the will of the population of a given administrative unit, 
expressed by the signatures of at least 10% of the population (without the res-
ervation that it applies only to adults). The will of the population expressed in 
this way is binding for the local administration and the local government. The 
draft treats all the levels of the administrative division of the country as equal, 
it does not provide for safeguards against the introduction of several non-state 
administrative languages in the same administrative unit. Thus after the law 
has been voted on, the following situation will be possible: for example in one 
of the counties105 of the Zakarpattia district several languages will be in force 
104 In this way, with Russian being excepted from Ukrainian alphabetical order and the me-
chanical addition of the three last languages which were put forward by the Venice Com-
mission. A brief outline of the nationalities in Ukraine is presented in the Appendix. 
105 In Ukrainian and Russian “raion”. 
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at the same time: Ukrainian as the state language, Hungarian as the district 
language, and Slovak and Romani as county languages. 
In the draft the earlier intention of introducing the languages of minorities 
as administrative languages directly on the basis of census results was aban-
doned (this would mean the compulsory, immediate introduction of Russian 
as an administrative language to 13 of the 27 districts of Ukraine and the intro-
duction of Crimean-Tatar in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, or Hungar-
ian in the Zakarpattia district and Romanian in the Chernivtsi district. The 
objective of introducing this change may have been to limit the political sig-
nificance of the census which is supposed to be held in 2012, which means it 
would coincide with the electoral campaign. The provision which states that 
the size of “regional language groups” is established on the basis of the census 
has been maintained in the draft; quite likely it is intended to provide a way to 
refuse to recognise the will of 10% of the population living in the region where 
for certain reasons it will be inconvenient for the local government. 
An important element of the draft, which takes into consideration the expec-
tations of the Ukrainian-speaking community and implements some of the 
demands of the Concept of the State Language Policy of President Viktor Yush-
chenko discussed above, is the commitment made by the government to support 
the development of the lexicographic base of Ukrainian106 and validating such 
dictionaries (including spelling dictionaries) used in administrative practice. 
One strong point of the draft is its complexity which includes the introduction 
of appropriate amendments in other legal acts featuring the norms of the ad-
ministrative language (procedure codes, the education law, the civil status law, 
the cinematography law etc.). Nevertheless, the reference made to the consti-
tution was removed from the amended provisions of these laws, since the law 
relating to language was recognised as the only legal act which regulates these 
issues. The law relating to language is therefore intended to have an overrid-
ing, quasi-constitutional character107. This intention is confirmed by the words 
106 Due to the insufficient number of specialist dictionaries, Russian is still the predominant 
language in the works of life science and physical science at the National Academy of Sci-
ences of Ukraine. Compare: Nikolai Danshyn, Yazykovy katamaran Ukrainy, Zerkalo Nedeli, 
no 10, 2010.
107 In Ukrainian publications the term “bazovy zakon” (basic law) is often used, which may be 
interpreted as referring to a special status of a law that regulates a given sphere of social life 
in a comprehensive way. However, this is not a legal term as the constitution of Ukraine has 
not introduced the hierarchisation or “categorisation” of laws. 
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of one of the draft’s authors, Vadym Kolesnichenko, that the law relating to 
language is set to become a “new social contract”108. 
There are no doubts that the discussed draft is focused not on the protection of 
regional languages but on the preservation if not the extension of the presence 
of Russian in the public sphere and in the work of the state administration. 
The draft is very liberal and (post)modern, which is manifested for example in 
the “principle of plurilingualism”109 which states that “each member of society 
freely speaks several languages, in contrast to the situation where particular 
language groups use only their own language” (this principle equates to the 
demand that all citizens of Ukraine fluently speak Russian). However, the lib-
eralisation of language in Ukraine will contribute to the presence of Russian 
increasing in the sphere of social life; the development of Ukrainian requires 
the use of some kind of affirmative action. 
108 Rada Evropy vymahaye priyniattia zakonu “Pro movy v Ukraini”, Holos Ukrainy, 5.10.2010.
109 An exact translation of the original neologism. 
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The phenomenon of bilingualism in Ukraine is a fact, as is the strong re-
gional differentiation of the language situation. 20 years of independence for 
Ukraine shows that there is no doubt that it is a durable phenomenon, resistant 
to the twists and turns of state politics, one which cannot be eliminated by 
means of political instruments or easily changed through the Ukrainisation 
of education (assuming that it will be fully implemented). Therefore, allowing 
Russian to be used in public life, also in the official sphere, is justified both on 
the grounds of the pragmatic functioning of the state and of human rights. 
2. The opposition to the establishment of Russian as the second official lan-
guage and the demand of the “positive discrimination” of Ukrainian in the me-
dia are commonly justified by the argument that the former will lead to the 
marginalisation of Ukrainian also in other spheres of public life. This argu-
ment seems relevant: indeed Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism may easily lead 
to the establishment of Russian-speaking monolingualism. And it appears that 
for at least a section of the champions of bilingualism this is exactly what they 
are seeking. 
“Granting full rights” to Russian or even only a further growth of its role in 
public life in Ukraine may contribute to the undermining of one of the cru-
cial symbolic attributes of the state and to threatening the human rights of the 
Ukrainian-speaking community. It could even lead to relegating Ukrainian in 
Ukraine to the role of a regional language, deprived of state support (in line 
with the Charter’s provisions). Therefore the efforts undertaken by the state in 
order to protect Ukrainian and to extend its use are justified as a principle (al-
though the Charter cannot be the basis for the protection of it). Nevertheless, 
these measures have not so far been established in Kyiv in a form that would be 
both effective and compatible with the standards of a democratic state. 
3. The role of language in the self-identification of Ukrainians is overstated 
and the language issue itself is strongly ideologised and politicised. The vast 
majority of the society does not see it as important and does not think they 
are being discriminated against on language grounds (as much as 84.5% of the 
respondents claim that they have not been subject to any violation of their lan-
guage rights110), although when applying European standards one can point to 
110 Russkiy yazyk v Ukraine bez emotsiy, op. cit.
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the discrimination (after 2004) of Russian-speaking citizens, particularly in 
the area of education. The language issue is, however, exceptionally important 
for the intellectual elite and nationalist circles (to a greater extent for Ukrain-
ian ones than Russian) for whom the language is both the instrument of ex-
pression and the tool of ideological dominion. The “two Ukraines” which are 
in conflict, if not hostile to each other – the Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine and 
Russian-speaking Ukraine – exist mainly, if not only, among the elite and put 
together they represent a minority in society. 
4. The fact that the majority of society does not consider the language issue as 
significant does however not mean that it is not important. Kyiv could afford 
to overlook this subject, even the fact that the current formula of bilingual-
ism hinders the functioning of the state, leads to the blurring of the linguistic 
norm (both the Ukrainian and the Russian one) and limits the capacity to ap-
preciate high culture, if it were not for Moscow’s policy. The constant pressure 
from Russia, which considers language to be an instrument of symbolic and 
political reintegration of the former Empire, forces Kyiv to pursue an active 
language policy, even more so that this pressure finds a following in Ukraine 
itself where the Russian chauvinist movement has been gathering momentum 
in recent years. 
5. When one considers the solutions to the language issue outlined in the intro-
duction which are theoretically possible, a consistent Ukrainisation is unreal-
istic: it could only be undertaken by a totalitarian regime and even so success 
would not be guaranteed since the societal forces which could endorse such 
a process are too faint and the economic interests linked with it are too weak. 
Furthermore, Kyiv would not find the international support for such an action, 
which would be needed to counterbalance Moscow’s opposition to it.
The introduction of bilingualism throughout the entire Ukrainian territory 
seems equally unrealistic. The establishment of Russian as the second state 
language appears to be even more unrealistic since one may anticipate violent 
opposition in the western part of Ukraine (going as far as to use separatist slo-
gans) and because it would be a far-reaching concession in the sphere of the 
state’s symbolic identity, even for the forces currently in power in Ukraine. 
What is however real is the legalisation of Russian as a tool used in the public 
administration in part of the country. Furthermore, since the removal of Rus-
sian from public life in Ukraine is unrealistic, this solution is becoming in-
evitable and sooner or later it will have to be implemented. If it involved a real 
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decentralisation of the state and the establishment of the local government of 
local communities, it would definitely be of advantage to Ukraine. 
6. The growing importance of the economic and symbolic factors in the lan-
guage issue makes it more difficult to introduce any uniform solution as on 
the one hand it causes the temperature of the dispute to rise and prevents a ra-
tional discussion and on the other hand it reinforces the pressure of market 
players which push forward their own interests. Due to these factors and the 
reluctance of the Kyiv elite, which has been apparent for many years, to take 
a clear-cut position on this issue the most likely scenario for the coming years 
will be the tolerance of the current “unofficial bilingualism”. 
TADEUSz A. OLSzAńSKI
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AppendIx
The nationalities in Ukraine
Besides Ukrainians and Russians there are members of 16 larger and a few doz-
en smaller national minorities living in Ukraine; they make up both national 
minorities and communities of immigrants. As they are treated on an equal 
footing with Russians legally and often in terms of propaganda, it is justified to 
present a brief outline of them. These nationalities are presented in the order 
of their numerical size determined by the census of 2001111.
Belarusians (276,000; in 1989, 440,000). They live across the country (they 
are concentrated in the largest numbers in the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk dis-
tricts and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). In the vast majority they 
are a group of immigrants and not a national minority (in districts bordering 
Belarus there are only 28,000 of Belarusians). The decline in the number of 
people declaring that they are Belarusians in the period between the censuses 
is explained by their assimilation which is characteristic of immigrants easily 
integrating themselves with the population where they live. 19.8% of Ukrain-
ian Belarusians recognised Belarusian as their native language, 65.2% said it 
was Russian and 17.5% declared that Ukrainian was their native language112. 
Moldovans (259,000; in 1989, 324,000). They live above all in the Odessa dis-
trict, where in one of the counties they constitute a relative majority, and also 
in the Chernivtsi district (its eastern part, historically belonging to Bessara-
bia, not Bukovina), in the lands which constitute the historical Moldovan set-
tlement. The distinction between Moldovans and Romanians is of a historical 
nature: those living in Bukovina, which once belonged to the Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire, declare themselves to be Romanians, whereas those in the com-
munity which lived in the lands of the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th 
century think of themselves as Moldovans. Moldovan was recognised as the 
native language by 70% of Ukrainian Moldovans, Russian by 17.6% and Ukrain-
ian by 10.7%. 
111 The census data after: Natsyonalny sostav naseleniya SSSR po dannym vsesoyuznoy 
perepisi naseleniya, Moskva 1991 and www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results, visited at 4.08.2004.
112 Here and below the data does not represent 100% since part of the people subject to the cen-
sus, particularly members of mixed families, declared a different native language. 
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Crimean Tatars (248,000; in 1989, 47,000). They live almost exclusively in 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in Sevastopol, a small group of them 
lives in the Kherson district. They are the traditional population of Crimea, 
in large part the descendants of the nationalities which inhabited the south-
ern part of the peninsula before the Mongolian conquest. In 1944 they were 
expelled to Central Asia and started returning to Crimea at the end of 1980s 
(which explains the huge increase in the number of Crimean Tatars in the pe-
riod between the censuses); a certain number of them still live in Uzbekistan 
and quite a large group lives in Moscow. 92% of Ukrainian Crimean Tatars rec-
ognised Crimean-Tatar as their native language, 6.1% said it was Russian and 
0.1% indicated Ukrainian. 
Bulgarians (205,000; in 1989, 234,000). They live mainly in the eastern part 
of the Odessa district, where in one of the counties they represent an absolute 
majority and in two other counties a relative majority. They are the descend-
ants of the refugees from the end of the 18th century, nowadays they are a na-
tional minority. Bulgarian was indicated as the native language by 64.2% of 
Ukrainian Bulgarians, Russian was chosen by 30.3% and Ukrainian by 5%. 
Hungarians (157,000; in 1989, 163,000). They live almost exclusively in the 
southern belt of the Zakarpattia district, on the lands of the historical Hun-
garian settlement. In one county they constitute an absolute majority and in 
two further ones they make up a relative majority of the population. 95.4% of 
Ukrainian Hungarians declared Hungarian to be their native language, 1% de-
clared it to be Russian and 3.4% indicated Ukrainian. 
Romanians (151,000; in 1989, 134,000). They live mainly in the Chernivtsi dis-
trict, where in two counties they represent an absolute majority, and in the 
Zakarpattia district, on the lands of the historical Romanian settlement. The 
increase in the number of their population may possibly be the consequence 
of the change in the declarations of certain people who earlier indicated the 
Moldovan nationality. Romanian was declared as the native language by 91.7% 
of Ukrainian Romanians, 1.5% indicated Russian and 6.2% Ukrainian. 
Poles (144,000; in 1989, 219,000). They live mainly in the Zhytomyr, Khmel-
nytsky and Lviv districts, and in all these districts they are greatly dispersed. 
They are the descendants of the former Polish population (lower nobility or 
peasants) and were linked with Polishness (with the exception of western 
Ukraine) rather by the religion than the language. A substantial decrease in 
declarations of Polishness results from the assimilation (reinforced by the 
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Ukrainisation of the Roman Catholic Church still underway in Ukraine) and 
partly from immigration to Poland. As the only (along with Slovaks) national 
minority in Ukraine Poles tend to adopt rather Ukrainian than Russian. 12.9% 
of Ukrainian Poles declared their native language to be Polish by, 15.6% indi-
cated Russian, and 71% Ukrainian. 
Jews (103,000; in 1989, 486,000). They live in Kyiv (18,000) and in the towns of 
eastern and southern Ukraine. Their traditional language was Yiddish, while 
Hebrew became increasingly learned towards the end of 20th century. A dra-
matic fall in the number of Jews can be explained by their mass immigration 
(its scope was larger than the comparison of the data reveals as simultane-
ously there was an ongoing process of many people who had earlier concealed 
their Jewish identity “coming out” as Jews). 3.1% of Ukrainian Jews declared 
their “own” language (we do not have any data as to what language that was) 
as native, 83% declared Russian to be their native language and 13.4% indicated 
Ukrainian. 
Armenians (100,000; in 1989, 54,000). In Ukraine Armenians are a commu-
nity of immigrants and they are to a minimal extent the descendants of for-
mer Armenians from the region of Podillia. They live dispersed, in towns. An 
increase in their number in the period between the censuses can be accounted 
for by their immigration. Armenian was declared to be the native language by 
50.4% of Ukrainian Armenians, Russian was indicated by 43.2% and Ukrainian 
by 5.8%. 
Greeks (91,000; in 1989, 98,000). They live mainly in the southern part of the 
Donetsk district. They are the descendants of Crimean Greeks, displaced here 
by Russia at the end of the 18th century. Their traditional languages are Rumai-
ica Greek which stems from Byzantine Greek, and Urum or Urumian, which 
belong to the Turkic language group; the promotion of Modern Greek in their 
community started only at the end of 20th century. Rumaiica and Urumian are 
nowadays used only by the oldest generation and it may be expected that they 
will be extinct quite soon. 6.4% of Ukrainian Greeks recognised as their native 
language their “own” language (we have no data as to which language of the 
three enumerated this was), 88.5% indicated Russian as their native language 
and 4.5% stated it was Ukrainian. 
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Tatars (73,000; in 1989, 87,000). They live mainly in industrial centres, one of 
the regions where they are concentrated is the Donetsk district, there are also 
many Tatars in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. They are 
a group of immigrants, the descendants of migrants from the Tatar Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republic (the present Tatarstan). They are not however 
so well established as to be considered a national minority. Tatar was declared 
to be the native language by 35.2% of Ukrainian Tatars, Russian was indicated 
by 58.7% and Ukrainian by 4.5%. 
Romanis (45,000; in 1989, 48,000). They live mainly in the Zakarpattia and 
Chernivtsi districts, also in the Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk districts; in large 
part they often change the place where they live. The lack of growth of their 
community, known for its high birth rate, is explained by emigration (mainly 
from the Zakarpattia district) and declaring other nationalities (particularly 
Hungarian) and, possibly, by not reaching some Romanis during the census. 
44.7% of Ukrainian Romanis reported their “own” language (it was not stated 
which one, there is not one single Romani language), Russian was declared 
by 13.4%, Ukrainian was indicated by 21.1% and ‘other’ (mainly Hungarian) 
by 20.8%. 
Azeris (45,000; in 1989, 37,000). They live in towns, dispersed; there are quite 
many of them in Crimea and in the Odessa district. They are an immigrant 
group, not deeply rooted and very mobile. Azerbaijani was reported to be the 
native language by 53% of Ukrainian Azerbaijanis, 37.6% of them said it was 
Russian and 7.1% indicated Ukrainian. 
Georgians (34,000; in 1989, 23,000.113). They live in towns, dispersed. They are 
an immigrant group, not deeply rooted 36.7% of Ukrainian Georgians reported 
that Georgian was their native language, 54.5% indicated it was Russian and 
8.2% declared it to be Ukrainian. 
Germans (33,000; in 1989, 38,000). They live mainly in the towns of eastern 
Ukraine; there is a small group in the Zakarpattia district which is a rural 
population. They are the descendants of consecutive waves of German im-
migration to the Russian Empire (except for Zakarpattia). 12.2% of Ukrainian 
113 Here and below the census data on nationalities with a population below 30,000 after: 
W. Baluk, Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej Ukrainy. Tradycje i współczesność, Wrocław 
2002, p. 19 and other sources. Official census publications do not provide these data. 
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Germans indicated German as their native language, 66.7% of them reported 
that it was Russian and 22.1% said it was Ukrainian. 
Gagauz (32,000; in 1989, 32,000). They live mainly in the eastern part of the 
Odessa district. It is a Turkic-speaking nationality whose religion is tradi-
tionally Orthodox. They are the descendants of the refugees from the end 
of 18th century from the lands of present-day Bulgaria; currently they con-
stitute a national minority. Most Gagauz live in Moldova where they enjoy 
autonomy. The Gagauz language was declared to be the native language by 
71.5% of the Ukrainian Gagauz, Russian was indicated by 22.7% of them and 
Ukrainian by 3.5%. 
Members of other nationalities (over a hundred, the exact figure was not giv-
en) totalled 177,000 (in 1989, 431,000). Most of them represent other nationali-
ties of the former USSR, they are immigrants in Ukraine. The most represented 
were: the Chuvash (in 1989, 20,000; in 2001, below 5,000), Uzbeks (respec-
tively 20,000 and 12,000), Mordvins (19,000 and below 5,000), Lithuanians 
(11,000 and 7,000), Kazakhs (10,000 and 5,000), Czechs (9,000 and 6,000), Ko-
reans (9,000 and 13,000), Udmurts (8,000 and below 5,000), Slovaks (8,000 
and 6,000), Bashkirs (8,000 and below 5,000) and Latvians (7,000 and 5,000). 
Below I present information about four groups which are national minorities 
in Ukraine; two of them sparked the interest of the Venice Commission dur-
ing the process of consultation of the draft of the Ukrainian law relating to 
language.
Slovaks (6,400; in 1989, 7,900). They live almost exclusively in the western 
part of the Zakarpattia district, in the historical area where the Slovak and 
Ukrainian settlements came into contact. 41.2% of Ukrainian Slovaks declared 
Slovak to be their native language, 5.2% said it was Russian and 41.2% indicated 
Ukrainian. 
Czechs (5,800; in 1989, 6,100). They live mainly in the Volyn district and con-
stitute a relic of the Czech colonisation of Volyn in the 19th century (most Czechs 
who survived the Second World War there left for Czechoslovakia). The infor-
mation about their linguistic identification is missing; they are most likely 
thoroughly Ukrainised. 
Karaims or Crimean Karaites (there is no census data for 2011— estimates es-
tablish their number at approximately 1,200 people, including 650 in Crimea; 
in 1989, 882). They live in Crimea (and also in Lithuania, Poland and Israel). 
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They are an ethno-religious group, their religion is pre-rabbinic Judaism, for-
merly they used their own language from the Kipchak group of Turkic languag-
es; Crimean Karaims already in the 19th century spoke mainly Crimean-Tatar. 
In 1989, 96 Crimean Karaims declared Karaim to be their native language, 
18 other Karaims said they could speak it. There are serious doubts whether 
currently in Crimea anybody still speaks this language. 
Krymchaks (there is no census data for 2011—estimates establish their num-
ber at from 200 to 500 people; in 1989, 604)114. They live in Crimea (and also 
in Israel). They make up an ethno-religious group, their religion is Rabbinic 
Judaism. They formerly used their own language which was close to Crimean-
Tatar. In 1989 125 people said Krymchak was their native language and further 
25 people declared they could speak it. There are serious doubts whether cur-
rently in Crimea anybody still speaks this language. 
*
The status of Rusyns as a contemporary ethnic or national group is debatable. 
The term Rusyns is the traditional, pre-national way in which Ukrainians and 
Belarusians defined themselves, it was preserved in the western borders of the 
Ukrainian ethnic area until the mid-20th century and survives in some parts 
of this area still today. Towards the end of the 20th century a small part of the 
Ukrainian population from Yugoslavia, Zakarpattia, Slovakia and Poland de-
clared themselves to be Rusyns (or Carpatho-Rusyns115) as a distinct, fourth 
East Slavic nation. There is no unanimity as to whether the Rusyn language is 
an autonomous language or whether it is just a quite well-developed dialect of 
Ukrainian (and thus not protected by the Charter). From the linguistic point 
of view the latter premise is justified, however such dialects have frequently 
been developed to reach the status of standard languages. 
In the Zakarpattia district there are Rusyn national organisations, Sunday 
schools etc. In 2007 the Zakarpattian district council recognised Rusyns – in 
the face of protests from Kyiv – as a national minority (which should lead to 
the recognition of the Rusyn language as a regional language). In the census of 
114 In older papers Krymchaks were called “Crimean Jews” to make a distinction between them 
and Eastern European Jews who also lived in Crimea. The term Krymchaks was probably 
introduced in order to avoid misunderstandings in regard to the former name. 
115 The Carpatho-Rusyn “national project” was established in the US at the beginning of the 
20th century.
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2001 10,000 of the district’s population (0.8%) declared Rusyn nationality. Nev-
ertheless it leaves no doubt that the number of people who consider themselves 
to be Rusyns and thus not Ukrainians (not “simply Rusyns”) is several times 
higher (even though it is still not considerable). A possible extension of the pro-
tection under the Charter to the Rusyn language may accelerate the develop-
ment of this language and nation, which would weaken Zakarpattia’s ties with 
Ukraine, the region already not strongly linked with the rest of the country. 
compiled by Tadeusz A. Olszański
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